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1 This paper was conceived in Professor Derrick Bell's seminar "Civil Rights at the
Crossroads," given at Harvard Law School in the fall of 1987. The opportunity to work
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[Q.Juestions arise from the ashes of our expectations: How
have we failed-and why? What does this failure mean-for black
people and for whites? Where do we go from here?3
Derrick Bell poses and explores these wrenching questions in
his moving book, And We Are Not Saved.4 The questions are not his
alone, nor are they confined to the world of legal scholarship. To
2 First names of authors are included in footnotes throughout, partly to aid in
general differentiation endeavors (e.g., distinguishing Kennedys), but more importantly
to provide an imperfect method for allowing identification of female authors in cases
where author gender is of interest to the reader but is not clear from the discussion.
3 DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUS-
TICE 3 (1987). The vagaries of publication schedules being what they are, there has
been a substantive lapse of time between the writing and acceptance of this Article and
its appearance in print. It is almost eerie to read these words of Derrick Bell's now, and
my ensuing talk of crisis and crossroads, knowing that they were written before not only
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), but also the baleful litter of
cases birthed by the Court in the summer of 1989. These cases include Jett v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989) (municipal and state governments not liable
for discriminatory practices performed as part of an employee's official duties); Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (§ 1981 does not cover conditions
of racial harrassment on the job, but only activities more narrowly confined to "making"
contracts); Lorance v. AT&T, 109 S. Ct. 2269 (1989) (statute of limitations restrictively
applied to Title VII claimants); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (disaffected,
nonconsenting white males given great latitude in when and how to attack affirmative
action consent decree); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (bur-
den of proof significantly stiffened for Title VII plaintiffs and disparate impact theory
significantly weakened). Suffice it to say that the sense of crisis has deepened and
intensified.
4 See D. BELL, supra note 3. Major portions of that book first appeared in Derrick
Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1985). The book is reviewed, inter alia, in Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology
of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988); Michael Tigar, Unfin-
ished Business, 73 A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1987), at 146; Note, The Battleground of Experience, 101
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1988). The partial version that originally appeared in the Harvard
Law Review was the subject of a forum in 3 HARV. BLACKLE-rrERJ. 46 (1986) (contribu-
tors included Derrick Bell, Regina Austin, Paul Dimond, Jane DeGidio, Linda Greene,
Joel Handler, Henry McGee, Daniel Monti, and Patricia Williams).
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the contrary, they are questions that haunt many of those caught up
in the movement for racial justice and the other struggles that fol-
lowed in its heady wake.5 Clearly the answers to such questions will
not come easily, and will not come primarily from within the law
schools.
Nevertheless, this Article will focus on the world of legal schol-
arship: specifically, how Derrick Bell's hard questions have struck
civil rights scholars. 6 I will trace lines of thought and strategies that
are evolving within the bounds of civil rights scholarship. I will also
put forward some of my own views about problems that civil rights
scholars need to address and about where "we" should go from
here.
The choice to focus on legal scholarship is, in one sense, com-
5 See generally TODD GIrLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1987) (a
personal political memoir and reflection on the new left politics of the 1960s: antiwar
protests, black liberation and beginnings of second-wave feminism); RACE, POLITICS AND
CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE RADICALISM OF THE 1960's (Adolph Reed ed. 1986)
[hereinafter RACE, POLITICS AND CULTURE] (essays exploring the ideology and social
context of the black political radicalism and new left politics of the 1960s).
6 I use "civil rights scholars" here as a term of art. I mean to refer to people
largely, but not exclusively, law-trained, both in and out of academia, who are attempt-
ing to reflect and write on the current state of race-and-law in the United States and who
identify with the words "we," "failure," and "go from here" in Professor Bell's ques-
tions. This group is both larger and smaller than a list one might cull from the ranks of
published equal protection authors. It consists, in important part, of people of color
and/or people on the political left. Its boundaries are ill-defined. Its work, like that of
current feminist legal scholars, is differentiated from much traditional legal scholarship
by the special tensions, problems and strengths that arise from its partisan relationship
to a social movement (however disunified) that has both an independent existence and
its own engagement with the courts and with evolving legal norms.
I am aware that choosing the term "civil rights scholar" generates some problems in
light of the current "rights debate." See infra notes 55-63 for a truncated discussion of
this controversy. Clearly some scholars I include in the category wish to reject any val-
orization of "rights" and have identified a kind of anti-rights theory as an important part
of their current work.
I nevertheless choose the term because (1) it summons forth the long shape and
history of the movement-rooted legal struggle on behalf ofjustice for people of color, a
shape and history I want to have present in my thinking and in this Article; (2) even
those who have attacked rights talk see themselves, for the most part, as members of a
partisan discourse about the meaning and future of "the civil rights struggle;" (3) im-
portant writers in the group have explicitly refused to reject rights discourse; and (4) all
the alternatives I have imagined seem highly unsatisfactory. (The list of alternatives
includes the option of no-label-at-all, with occasional resort to a vague "we," us,"
"ourselves," etc. It also includes various phrases such as "anti-racism scholars," "race-
and-law scholars," "movement lawyers," "partisan scholars," and "anti-discrimination
advocates." In light of common sense and the discussions below, I believe it will be
clear why none of the above appear acceptable.)
I am, in any case, certain that this difficulty in terminology reflects the crossroads
condition in which we find ourselves. There may be a number of serious thinkers who
believe my assumption that any meaningful "we" or "us" or "ourselves" exists at this
point is wishful thinking, bankrupt nostalgia, or both. I suppose the coherence and
identity of the band of travelers is as much in dispute as what road the journey should
take.
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pelled by personal biography: issues of competence are daunting
enough even within the sphere where I am privileged to make my
living, let alone beyond it. The choice, however, also springs from
my conviction that prevailing legal doctrines and ideologies have
power and force, beyond the academy and the courtroom, to shape
racism in its real manifestations and metamorphoses. It follows that
legal thought can be a fruitful focus for those who believe the battle
for racial justice has thus far failed in important ways, and who want
to be part of propelling it on a better path.
Recent scholarship, 7 drawing on eclectic sources," has argued
persuasively that legal doctrine has important social power, that it
shapes people's consciousness of themselves and their world, en-
larging or restricting their vision of how things are, could be and
should be. Historians also have pointed out the important role of
law as mediator and unifier for Americans in particular,9 and the
intense and intricate involvement of law and legal doctrine in the"
history of African-American people in this country.' 0
Race law doctrine has an effect, for example, on those of us
considering Professor Bell's questions, and on others, in and out of
the legal profession, who perhaps want no part of the questions, or
have not yet dreamed of them. If the ideology of civil rights law
itself, its spoken and unspoken message, is an active agent in our
7 Despite the embarrassment of finding myself in the backwash of an evolving con-
vention (first the tradition of the obligatory Critical Legal Studies footnote, then the
counter-tradition of the obligatory disavowal of the obligatory Critical Legal Studies
footnote), I think I should indicate that I refer here primarily to the work of people
associated with the Critical Legal Studies, or "CLS," movement. Papers that have paid
particular attention to the question of legal ideology as shaper-of-consciousness (and
therefore as shaper-of-world) include Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1059 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Con-
sciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 3
(1980); Karl Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargain-
ing Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450 (1981); Karl Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 TELOS 123
(1979).
8 The following incomplete list gives some sense of the breadth of the sources
people claim: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Q.
Hoare & G. Smith trans. 1971); WOLFGANG KOHLER, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY (1947);
GEORGE LUKAS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS (R. Livingstone trans. 1971); KARL
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1940); JEAN PIAGET, STRUCTURALISM (C. Maschler
trans. 1970); Douglas Hay, Prperty, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL
TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 17 (Hay, Linebaugh, Rule,
Thompson, and Winslow eds. 1975).
9 See, e.g., Morton Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 60 (1987) ("As is typical of American history.., the
central arena of controversy in this country over the liberal idea of the neutral state was
constitutional law.").
10 See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (2d ed. 1980); DER-
RICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (Ist ed. 1972); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN
THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978); Haywood Bums, Law and Race in America, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW 89 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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social reality, then a real understanding and analysis of race and law
in our system would be an important contribution toward change,
not simply an academic exercise.
Certainly there are pitfalls in focusing on legal doctrine, espe-
cially at the level of abstraction with which this Article concerns it-
self. Social engineering delusions may overestimate the real-world
significance of legal moves, and a self-absorbed discourse may iso-
late speakers from people they need to know and from crucial
worlds of insight and power beyond the academy. Nevertheless, if
we are able to discern patterns in the ways that civil rights doctrine
has intersected with real gains and losses for women and men of
color, if we can see a drift in the ways it has shaped popular percep-
tions of racial rights and racial wrongs, if we can trace the sources of
the differences among intellectuals presently struggling with the
past meanings and future directions of race law, such insight into
legal doctrine should be of use to people seeking deep societal
changes.
Of course, we cannot legislate or litigate an end to racism
"from above,"' 1 and doctrinal analysis alone will not magically
translate even into changed consciousness, much less into changed
social or economic relations. The ending or crippling of American
racism will require unprecedented participation and involvement of
people, black and white, throughout the lower ranks of our society.
Such participation must be both lively and dead serious. It is my
hope that legal scholarship will be useful in such a larger push to-
ward participation by broad numbers of people. It is in that spirit
that I offer this paper.' 2
11 Deep doubt about the ability of law and legal process to play a significant role in
further social change is one feature of the crossroads we confront. Bernadette Chachere
states: "I... question the potential of civil rights to significantly improve the economic
condition of the poor .... I ... broaden the issue and ask to what extent the United
States Constitution and the legal process can be used as vehicles for economic change."
Bernadette Chachere, Welfare and Poverty as Roadblocks to the Civil Rights Goals of the 1980's,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 789, 789 (1985). Tilden Lemelle notes:
Whether a society in which racism has been internalized and institu-
tionalized to the point of being an essential and inherently functioning
component of that society-a culture from whose inception racial dis-
crimination has been a regulative force for maintaining stability and
growth and for maximizing other cultural values-whether such a society
of itself can even legislate (let alone enforce) public policy to combat racial
discrimination is most doubtful.
Tilden Lemelle, in RICHARD BURKEY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE
UNrrED STATES 38 (1971), excerpted in DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
100 (1st ed. 1972).
12 It troubles me that I feel distinctly uncomfortable making statements like those
in this paragraph. The statements are hardly novel. But in this context they sound
somehow inflated? ... silly? I trace my discomfort to a desire for a diction appropri-
ately (1) scholarly and/or (2) post-modernly sophisticated. Only in the most qualified
way do I in fact want to honor either of those desires in this context.
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Part II will try to give some sense of the "ashes" of Professor
Bell's questions, to convey the widely-shared feeling that we have
come to a charred and barren place, that past directions, at best,
have petered out or, at worst, have led us astray, and that we are
facing a crossroads. I will sketch the picture first by narrative,
describing some of the features of the journey to this point, and
then by doctrine, taking a focused look at a special piece of the pres-
ent landscape, the "innocent victim" in affirmative action
jurisprudence.
In Part III I will leave the microlevel of affirmative action to set
out two "models" of white supremacy that I hope will be useful for
understanding what may animate different approaches currently be-
ing explored by civil rights scholars in the search for legal and polit-
ical tools against white supremacy. 13 Each model offers, in a crude
way, an explanation of why the conditions of white dominance and
black subordination have survived and proved so resistant to
change, how this racial system has attained its apparent ability to
withstand attacks that were at many junctures so well-fought and
that seemed so often to offer resounding victories. Neither model
represents an embraced position or a coherent theory that current
literature actually advances;14 they are simply constructs posed for
discussion. The models are: White Supremacy as a Feature of Class
Domination (the "class model") and White Supremacy for Its Own
Sake (the "race model"). I will offer ideas about why neither model
alone recommends itself to the civil rights scholar as an adequate
approach to our dilemmas.
Part IV will discuss where we might go from here, beginning
with an observation on what civil rights scholars are presently saying
about the conjunction of race and class, going on to examine some
current methodological questions, and finally proposing several
specific projects I want to urge upon civil rights scholars. Part V is a
conclusion.
13 By use of the word "model" I do not mean anything at all fancy. My intention is
to set out a series of schematic, skeletal, largely fictional pictures whose simplicity will, I
hope, aid discussion. They are hypotheticals.
14 A partial exception is Alan Freeman's thesis about the constraining effects that
liberal ideology and the needs of our class system exert on racial remediation. See gener-
ally Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE PoLrrxcs OF LAw 96
(D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter Freeman, Critical Review]. Freeman is nearly the indi-
vidual architect of the "class legitimation model" I discuss below. See infra notes 146-48
and accompanying text. I have simplified, polarized and "thingified" Freeman's ideas to
the point where I suspect I diverge from what he meant to say in 1982 or would want to
add today. Since this paper was written, Professor Freeman has in fact said some more.
Readers should consult Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest for Equality of Opportu-
nity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988) [hereinafter Freeman,
Racism, Rights].
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II
"THE ASHES OF OUR EXPECTATIONS"
A. The Journey Here
Civil rights scholars in the late 1980s find themselves surveying
a bleak landscape in anger and confusion. 15 In 1984, Professor Bell
described this landscape: "[O]ne is tempted to borrow the
marathoner's hitting-the-wall analogy in analyzing the barriers to
further progress in the once-vibrant movement to end racial dis-
crimination, a movement now brought to a virtual halt."'16
The sense of pain so frequently evident in the recent writings of
civil rights law crusaders' 7 stems in large part from two related, yet
seemingly contradictory, phenomena. First, the ground is strewn
with slain dragons and proofs of victory. Within our lifetimes, peo-
ple of color have overcome legal and illegal obstacles alike, one af-
ter the other, through offensive and defensive courtroom and
legislative strategies (sparked and supported by masses of people in
motion whose courage and resourcefulness in the buses, court-
houses, restaurants, jails and streets we must remember).' 8 Superb
15 I should, of course, acknowledge that in this regard the civil rights scholar is
marching to a radically different drummer than are others in our society. As Alan Free-
man notes, "there seems today to be a dominant mood of complacency, a sentiment,
however inaccurate, that blacks and other minorities have gotten enough and should
now make it on their own." Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 96. Walter Wil-
liams concedes that some blacks have been left behind, but denies that this fact is attrib-
utable to race and insists that the overall picture is one of "tremendous socioeconomic
gains of blacks in general over the last forty years." Walter Williams, The False Civil
Rights Vision, 21 GA. L. REV. 1119, 1139 (1987).
John Calmore quotes a Reagan domestic affairs adviser as follows: "The 'War on
Poverty' that began in 1964 has been won; the growth ofjobs and income in the private
economy, combined with an explosive increase in government spending and income
transfer programs, has virtually eliminated poverty in the United States." John
Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L.
REV. 201, 214 (1982). Few would go this far, but many think minorities have gotten all
they need, or if they have not, it is because of their own failings. Civil rights scholars,
however, see matters differently, as will become clear below.
16 Derrick Bell, A Hurdle Too High: Class-based Roadblocks to Racial Remediation, 33
BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) [hereinafter Bell, Hurdle] (This article presents the 1983
James McCormick Mitchell Lecture. Derrick Bell was the lecturer. Panelists were Alan
Freeman, Monroe Fordham, and Sidney Willhelm).
17 "[M]any of us felt that there was a crisis of confidence and a growing sense of
despair among those involved in the Civil Rights Movement." Foreword Civil Rights De-
velopments, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 667, 667 (1985). Vocabulary alone reveals this pain.
One scholar talks of the "premature death" of the civil rights movement. Calmore, supra
note 15, at 215. Another discusses "paralysis." Ralph Smith, Alternatives to Paralysis: A
Working Paper Precipitated by the Affirmative Action Cases, 61 OR. L. REV. 317, 317 (1982).
18 See generally WILLIAM BEARDSLEE, THE WAY OUT MUST LEAD IN (2d ed. 1983); Eyes
on the Prize (six-part video documentary, produced by Blackside, Inc., first aired on Public
Broadcasting Service 1987); You Got to Move (80-minute film featuring civil rights activ-
ists produced by Lucy Massie Phenix, Veronica Selver, and Cumberland Mt. Film Coop-
erative 1986).
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work by courageous and inventive attorneys like William Hastie and
Thurgood Marshall achieved astounding results. 19 Though the pic-
ture dimmed in the seventies and eighties, it is nevertheless undeni-
able that dramatic gains were made in dismantling Jim Crow laws
and practices and in establishing rights of access and participation
for blacks in all kinds of settings and institutions.20
Equally clear, however, are the stubborn and devastating reali-
ties of present life for the vast majority of black people. They con-
tinue to constitute a disproportionate number of those who live in
unemployment and poverty. They reside in largely separate and un-
equal neighborhoods and attend largely separate and unequal
schools. Their health and mortality statistics are shocking. They
are still regularly subjected to behavior ranging from the minor in-
sult to the life-taking assault at the hands of consciously and uncon-
sciously bigoted whites.2 1
Adding salt to the wound is the fact that the dragon-slaying
sword of anti-discrimination law, which the crusaders forged and
wielded so handily against the enemy, has lost most of its power to
defend, rescue or avenge people of color. "[W]ith each passing day
the remedial relevance of law becomes more nebulous and less
hopeful."' 22 Perhaps most disturbing, anti-discrimination doctrine is
even being turned, in dramatic instances, upon the victims of white
supremacy themselves, "the very group the fourteenth amendment
was created to protect." 23 Lawyers have found themselves question-
19 See generally GILBERT WARE, WILLIAM HASTIE: GRACE UNDER PRESSURE (1984);
and CATHERINE BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CRow: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN
TRANSIT (1983).
20 The gains have been such that the New York Times could, in its front page story of
JesseJackson's amazing sweep in the Southern primaries, quote civil rights soldierJohn
Lewis:
To me, it is unbelievable, extraordinary to see the distance we have
come .... If someone had told me 23 years ago when we walked across
that bridge-I couldn't register and vote in Alabama, my mother and fa-
ther couldn't vote in 1965-if someone had told me I would have the
opportunity to vote for a black man for President, I would have said,
"You're out of your mind."
Blacks, Years After Selma, Share in Jackson's Victory, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1988, at A1, col. 4,
and A27, col. 1.
21 For numbers and analysis on the plight of the black underclass, see generally
WILLIAM WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987). See also A COMMON DESTINY:
BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (G. Jaynes & R. Williams, eds. 1989).
22 Calmore, supra note 15, at 203.
23 Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1335-36 (1986). See also Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Dis-
crimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (describing how, in the face of antidiscrimination law, blacks
remain disadvantaged in many settings). For a particularly high-pitched example of the
new uses of anti-discrimination rhetoric, see William Bradford Reynolds, An Equal Oppor-
tunity Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1987).
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ing both the future and the past.
Some have even argued that the civil rights struggle may have
done more harm than good. 24 Some victories that seemed, for a
time, like a ladder out of oppression have begun to feel more like a
demonic ferris wheel, grinding ever onward in its oppressive and
repetitive round, and driven more by the force of white advantage
than by any imperative for black justice.
In several articles Derrick Bell reconsiders the history of civil
rights gains and concludes that a major dynamic is what he calls the
"Interest-Convergence Dilemma." 25 In his rendition, the fate of Af-
rican-Americans has not been constantly bleak. Rather, there have
been cycles, variations and moments of improvement.2 6 Unfortu-
nately, however, these moments have little or no relation to black
need, black power or black influence. Instead they are dictated by
white needs, desires and interests. Even if a reform follows organ-
ized demands, it is on terms molded to white ends and vulnerable to
white changes of heart. "Reform is seldom forthcoming until white
policymakers perceive some self-interest-based benefit for them-
selves or, occasionally, for other whites. When the reform is
adopted, justice for blacks is given as the sole motivation .... "27
24 "[Rleal gains may have deepened the legitimacy of the system as a whole." Rob-
ert Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 286 (D. Kairys ed.
1982). One civil rights scholar claims that "antidiscrimination law as it has evolved from
1954 to the present has served more to rationalize the continued presence of racial dis-
crimination in our society than it has to solve the problem." Freeman, Critical Review,
supra note 14, at 97. See also Adolph Reed, The "Black Revolution" and the Reconstitution of
Domination, in RACE, POLITICS, AND CULTURE, supra note 5, at 61-95 (arguing that both
the new left and the civil rights movement aided capitalism in rationalizing and modern-
izing its fundamentally oppressive consumption system).
25 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); D. BELL, 1 RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d
ed. 1972), supra note 10.
26 Bell, Hurdle, supra note 16, at 2-3.
27 Id. at 3. Derrick Bell has come up with myriad examples of the "interest-
covergence" principle at work. He argues, for instance, that abolition was finally imple-
mented as a military necessity and to help northern industrial and commercial interests
achieve national dominance. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, An American Fairy Tale: The Income-
Related Neutralization of Race Law Precedent, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 331 passim and sources
cited therein (1984) [hereinafter Bell, Fairy Tale].
After encountering Bell's analysis in this regard, I was amazed, upon re-reading
Dred Scott, to find Justice Taney explaining, "The unhappy black race ... were never
thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of
the trader were supposed to need protection." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
410 (1857) (emphasis added). The Court continued:
[Even the 1774 Connecticut statute forbidding slave importation
was] carefully introduced, in order to prevent any misunderstanding of
the motive which induced the Legislature to pass the law, and places it
distinctly upon the interest and convenience of the white population-excluding
the inference that it might have been intended in any degree for the ben-
efit of the other.
And in the [1784 Connecticut abolition statute] the section is again
1989] 1001
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Thus blacks can always hope that their situation might improve,
but if that happens, it will be for reasons extraneous to themselves-
for someone else's (probably undisclosed) purposes. They must
therefore endure the twin torture of having their gains always vul-
nerable and their oppressors repeatedly making off with the prize.28
Developments in the legal climate have, of course, been accom-
panied by parallel changes in the world of political and social action.
A reactionary federal administration openly opposes a wide array of
civil rights gains, and has impressed its stamp on every aspect of the
federal governmental apparatus, including the judiciary. White
public sentiment widely perceives "reverse discrimination" as ab-
horrent and prevalent.2 9 The number of reported acts of racially-
motivated violence is increasing. 30 The coalition that pushed the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 through
Congress has splintered31 and the mass movement is largely quies-
cent, at least for the present.32 The Supreme Court, with a spate of
introduced by a preamble assigning a similar motive for the act.., show-
ing that the right of property in the master was to be protected, and that
the measure was one of policy, and to prevent the injury and inconven-
ience, to the whites, of a slave population in the State.
Id. at 414 (emphasis added). We must presume, of course, that Justice Taney knew, as
well as we do, that one cannot take self-serving legislative declarations at face value. At
first reading Dred Scott is remarkable to modem ears for its lack of inhibition in stating
"true facts" about American ante-bellum treatment of blacks. On closer examination,
however, Taney is performing deep slights-of-hand in maintaining that the Court had no
choice in the matter. I do not quote Dred Scott as "proof of the truth of the matter
asserted." But the opinion certainly shows that Bell's thesis is not a new one, nor is it
restricted to friends of black progress.
28 An opening for hope consistent with Bell's thesis is that oppressed people can
change what rulers perceive to be in their own best interests. The destabilizing effects of
protest and resistance can alter the cost-benefit calculus so that change favorable to
blacks actually comes to be in the interest of dominant forces. This was clearly part of
what happened during the 1960s.
29 Apparently some members of the Supreme Court share this perception. SeeJus-
tice Scalia's dissent in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal. 480
U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (affirmative action is a "powerful engine of
racism and sexism"). See infra note 298 and accompanying text. Scalia's views on affirm-
ative action were no secret prior to his appointment, of course. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia,
The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U.L. Q. 147.
30 See The
, 
Don't All Wear Sheets: A Chronology of Racist and Far Right Violence-1980-
86, Center for Democratic Renewal (Atlanta 1987) (report on incidents of racial, reli-
gious and homophobic violence).
31 The recent resurrection of old (and the creation of some new) alliances during
the struggle to defeat the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court qualifies this
statement in hopeful ways, as did some aspects of the Jesse Jackson presidential
campaign.
32 To characterize the mass movement as quiescent may be a distortion. People are
clearly in motion on a number of issues related to race, and in several different places,
from Forsythe County, Georgia, see David Treadwell & Barry Bearak, 20,000 March
Against Klan Attack in Georgia: 60 Arrested but No Major Violence or Injuries Reported in Biggest
Rights Protest in Decades, L.A. Times, Jan. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (Sunday final ed.), to
Howard Beach, New York, see Margot Hornblower, N.Y. marchers protest racial attacks;
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cases announcing serious set-backs for civil rights claimants, seems
recently to have shed its skin and announced a new era.33
These developments have a particularly sharp and bitter sting
for civil rights scholars who, as I have defined them,3 4 are partisan in
this project. Many of these people had expected that by this time
they would be living in a different and more just world. 35 They had
dared to dream that their children's youth would be largely free of
racial wounds.3 6 They had envisioned themselves working for dif-
hundreds gather in neighborhood where black died in chase, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1986, at Al,
col. 1. The fact that this still does not feel like a national "mass movement," seems
palpable, but also somewhat mysterious to me. The role of the media in creating or
blocking consciousness of movement needs further exploration. See Murray Edelman,
The Construction of Social Problems as Buttresses of Inequalities, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127
(1987).
33 See supra note 3 for citation to some of the cases of the summer of 1989. Of
course, reactions to the Court's recent moves differ. A recent article in the ABAjournal
by an attorney who represents defendants in civil rights cases applauds the Court's re-
cent cases and pooh-poohs what the author perceives as overblown reactions from the
civil rights community:
[The recent cases are] welcome news for employers . . . because
these decisions give them the chance to defend against civil-rights related
employment suits on an equal footing with their adversaries.
On the other hand, the decisions should not be cause for alarm
among civil-rights proponents; contrary to the more intemperate reac-
tions on both sides, the major victories of the civil-rights movement of
the 1960s have been left intact.
Francis Coleman, New Rules for Civil Rights, A.B.A. J., Oct. 5, 1989, at 78.
Conversely, civil rights activists and scholars have greeted the summer's opinions
with marked alarm. The National Lawyers Guild in the Fall of 1989 issued an informa-
tional packet on the summer's cases that opened with the following:
In a series of dramatic decisions all issued in June 1989, the United
States Supreme Court made the most sweeping roll back of civil rights
laws since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed. The decisions, which
vastly narrow the scope and strength of the two major Civil Rights Acts,
also overrule nearly unanimous Circuit Court and Supreme Court prece-
dents, many issued during the Nixon appointed Burger Court years. The
decisions thus overrule a mainstream consensus, joined by liberal and
conservative judges as to the proper reach of the civil rights laws.
National Lawyers Guild, "Supreme Court Dramatically Rolls Back Civil Rights Laws,"
Fall 1989, on file with Cornell Law Review.
34 See supra note 6.
35 Derrick Bell recounted a telling anecdote in his seminar, supra note 1. As a
young aspiring civil rights lawyer fresh out of law school, he visited a great civil rights
litigator. After hearing of Bell's desire to join the effort, the older lawyer praised him
for his worthy motives. "I am proud of you, young man, but you've come too late. The
battle has been won." Few people in the civil rights movement were this optimistic for
long, if ever, but the story is a poignant one, and suggests something of what I mean to
say here. Conversation with Derrick Bell (1988).
36 Professor Charles Lawrence tells a haunting story of his own and his young
daughter's encounters, twenty-eight years apart, with Little Black Sambo in the classroom.
Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 317-18 (1987). And I recall vividly the high hopes of the Quaker-
sponsored bi-racial "Creative Writing" classes for young people that I attended in At-
lanta in the summer of 1961. These classes proposed to smooth the way for the cau-
tiously tiny beginnings of high-school desegregation in the coming fall. I felt then that I
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ferent clients or masters than those for whom they now labor.3 7
They (particularly scholars of color) had not foreseen the dynamics
working to separate them so painfully from the many still "left
behind." 38
A number of civil rights scholars have moved into academic set-
tings3 9 where they can direct their time and resources to thinking
and writing about the state of white supremacy and civil rights law.40
This paper reports on some of the results of this thinking and writ-
ing, and explores possible assumptions and theories that may be at
work.
was part of a great historic step into a new world. Now I find defacto segregation alive
and well in my children's "unitary" schools in Tennessee. These are patterns of pain
and disappointment.
37 Joel Kovel's satisfyingly sardonic comment is "[t]o have begun political life so
spectacularly and to end up in the ignominy of a tenure battle is galling in the extreme."
Joel Kovel & Adolph Reed, What's Left: An Exchange, in RACE, POLITICS AND CULTURE,
supra note 5, at 263.
38 Derrick Bell observes: "Intended or not, those of us who have 'moved on up'
serve as a ready rationalization for others who wish to blame the suffering of poverty-
level blacks on the victims." Bell, Fairy Tale, supra note 27, at 345.
John Calmore voices a common concern when he pleads, "It is now very important
for upwardly mobile blacks to view their marginality in a positive light and to choose
conscientiously to remain on the margin if black unity and functional communal respon-
sibility are even to approximate meaningful reality." Calmore, supra note 15, at 239.
39 Of course, some fine civil rights scholars began their careers in academic settings
as well.
40 It must be said, however, that in the case of female and male scholars of color in
academia, the time and resources are won at great cost. There is a growing body of
testimony about life for minority scholars in legal academia which deserves serious at-
tention and response. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 3, at 140-61; HANDBOOK FOR WOMEN
SCHOLARS (M. Kehoe ed. 1982); Regina Austin, Resistance Tactics for Tokens, 3 HARV.
BLACKLErrERJ. 52 (1986) [hereinafter Austin, Resistance Tactics]; Derrick Bell & Richard
Delgado, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
347 (1989); Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspective, Stanford L. Sch.J., May 9,
1986, at 5; Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still White
Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986) [hereinafter Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise]; Roy
Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors Avoid the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20
U.S.F. L. REV. 419 (1986); Richard Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Wo-
men on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988); Andrew Haines, Mi-
nority Law Professors and the Myth of Sis)phus: Consciousness and Praxis Within the Special
Teaching Challenge in American Law Schools, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 247 (1988); Charles Law-
rence, A Dream: On Discovering the Significance of Fear, 10 NOVA L.J. 527 (1986); Charles
Lawrence, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Needfor Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L.
REV. 429 (1986); Rachel Moran, Commentary: The Implications of Being a Society of One, 20
U.S.F. L. REV. 503 (1986); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound! (Oct. 24, 1987) (unpub-
lished text of talk given to AALS Workshop for Women in Legal Education, on file with
Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter Austin, Sapphire Bound!]; Derrick Bell, Memorandum
to Harvard Law School Record (Nov. 22, 1987) (on file at Cornell Law Review) [herein-
after Bell, Memorandum] (documenting an incident that transpired while Bell was a vis-
iting professor at Stanford Law School in the spring of 1986). Cf Randall Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of LegalAcademia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989) (questioning some of the
assumptions and approaches reflected in some of the works just cited while further doc-
umenting past and continuing abuses).
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First, however, I will take a more focused look at one specific
area of contemporary doctrine, namely the current state of affirma-
tive action in the Supreme Court. This is a particularly charged and
difficult area of present civil rights law, one that I believe is emblem-
atic of our present condition. In many ways present affirmative ac-
tion doctrine is the open wound of contemporary civil rights
jurisprudence. It reveals important failings in our present efforts to
understand and end white supremacy.
B. Troubled Doctrine: Affirmative Action
1. The Innocent Victim Introduced
Affirmative action has been the most harrowing and publicly-
debated issue in civil rights law of the last decade. The question of
the "innocent victim" has in turn been the most harrowing and pub-
licly-debated issue in affirmative action.
The sudden appearance of the innocent victim upon the consti-
tutional stage has been amazing to behold. Shuffling out from the
wings, blinking in the glare of the stage lights, this guy, it turns out,
has rights he never even dreamed of, like a right to his job! Well,
sometimes. At least if the immediate threat to that job is a black
and/or a woman. Where did this figure come from? Why the star-
ring role? What exactly is his (or occasionally her) role? Why is he
being treated this way? And how did he get here, assigned top bill-
ing as the principal reason why society can no longer justify or toler-
ate race remediation in many of the areas where it might matter
most?
In wrestling with the preceding questions and in the related
project of trying to speak persuasively about the justice of affirma-
tive action, I have been circling back to allegory for years. Many
whites are critical and impatient with continuing black demands.
("We (or somebody) already opened the door and told these people
to join the party. Now they are here. Why are they still com-
plaining? What they're asking for now is just special favors, and
that's not fair.") In the endeavors of understanding and persuad-
ing, metaphor has often seemed to serve more fruitfully than the
circuitry of equal protection doctrine. Emboldened by my creative
predecessors, 41 I now propose an excursion. I want to try out on
41 Derrick Bell, Patricia Williams and others have done us the exemplary service of
demonstrating the uses in legal scholarship of radically "different" voices. Bell's recent
book was treated as fiction in the N.Y. Times Book Review, Oct. 11, 1987, at 7, col. 1.
Williams used fable and allegory powerfully in her article on Critical Legal Studies, Al-
chemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
401 (1987). We have been shown the magical uses of a homemade scholarly telephone
booth: into this space the academic disappears, to emerge a few lines later in the exhila-
rating garb of fable, poetry, italics-whole new worlds. In my own case, the move is
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you, patient readers, a polemical tale.4 2
The scene is a party. The people in charge of the party, after
tremendous pressure from previously excluded social groups, have
at last opened the gates and let some of these people in to join the
festivities. Most of the new admittees are low on funds and, since it
takes resources to participate in this party, the authorities have been
giving them a few bills at the door, along with a few special passes to
allow them to catch up on the special activities within. In other
words, this is a party with Affirmative Action.
The party is troubled. The supply of bills is rumored to be
getting low and some of the party goers have heard reports about
the special distributions to newcomers and are beginning to com-
plain. Uniformed people are circulating through the party trying
to keep a lid on things: some are bouncers and some are people
with special training in the Rules of the Game. One of the latter,
known to the assembly as Doc, is scanning the crowd when some-
one yells out to him.
"Hey, Doc! How come they're giving bills to these guys when
they come in the door? You didn't give me any bills when I first
got here. Isn't that against the Rules? What about the Rules?"
And sure enough, if you look around at the party decorations,
you will find that there are posters everywhere announcing and
explaining the Rules. They display slogans like:
-- EVERY BILL A RIGHTFULLY OBTAINED BILL-
'BILLS GO TO THE SWIFTEST-
- NO FREE BILLS
-A BILL IN THE HAND OF ONE
IS EQUAL TO A BILL IN THE HAND OF ANOTHER-
-EVERYONE HAS AN EQUAL RIGHT TO SEEK
BILLS-
-. RESPECT YOUR NEIGHBOR'S BILLS
There are other slogans too:
made at some cost: I step forth. Alas, inescapably NOT the new Nadine Gordimer.
These things are hard to face at my age. Nevertheless, I am grateful for the
encouragement.
42 For another use of storytelling and story reading, see Robert Williams, Taking
Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory For Peoples of Color, 5 LAw &
INEQUALITY 103 (1987). The author, a member of the Lumbee Indian tribe, retells and
rereads the Parable of the Grandfather and the Elevator as part of a longer project of
rediscovering his own people's suppressed but "discrete insurrectionist discourse." Id.
at 104.
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-EACH PERSON CAN SPEAK HIS OR HER MIND-
-. BE KIND TO OTHERS
-DON'T FORGET: NOW WOMEN AND BLACKS CAN
PLAY TOO
-- CAST YOUR VOTE ON ELECTION DAY-
-EXPRESS YOURSELF-
-ENJOY LIFE-
But it is the Rules about the BILLS that are making people
angry.
"Hey, Doc, it's not fair!"
Pretty soon a few scuffles break out. Exhausted and confused
newcomers who have been given a few bills at the door are at-
tacked by old timers. It appears that most of these attacks come
from those who lack the bills to pay for any of the delicious snacks
displayed on lovely banquet tables. Apparently the snacks are un-
available to those who cannot pay. There is no other source of
food immediately in sight. This is a confusing party. The lights
are dim, and suspended above the party-goers heads is a revolving
ball of mirrors; it turns to the beat of loud dance music and casts
sliding, dizzying chips of light over the throngs of partygoers at
this affair.
There are knots of people scattered about playing different
games, taking bets and exchanging bills. In fact, the main concern
of everyone seems to be getting more bills. Many are standing in
lines waiting for an opportunity to join a game. Some of the
games require that you put up a substantial number of bills before
you are allowed to play. At some of the cheaper games there are
long snaking cords of people waiting for their chance. Some peo-
ple are beginning to get irritable.
For someone who just came in from outside, or who has been
recently admitted to an unfamiliar game line, it is difficult to figure
out exactly what is going on. Some women and blacks are wan-
dering around looking a little dazed and trying to learn how to
join one of these knots, how to get more bills. It is beginning to
dawn on them that the bills are crucial. They find that some of the
old-timers are hostile and don't want to show them how to play.
Some of the old-timers can be heard grumbling about the new
dance music coming over the sound system and about the fact that
women and coloreds used to serve the food and sweep up at the
end of the day instead of trying to push their way into the game
lines. If you look closely, you will see that some old-timers seem
to be wandering too; they are complaining that a game they
played for years has inexplicably been withdrawn from play. Peo-
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ple who have given up trying to find a game they can join sit at
benches around the sides of the dance floor.
Few at the party have ever seen the room upstairs where the
bills are counted and where decisions are made about what games
will be set up below. Few have seen the trucks that periodically
pull up to the side door and haul bills away. For those on the
floor it is hard enough to keep up with what's going on around
them. Just now the arrival of the newcomers is causing friction.
A newcomer walks up to one of the longer lines. This is
Ashanna. She is black and lean, with a tight jaw and a tiny muscle
that jumps too often at the corner of her eye. She is carrying an
official document with her, a special pass. It took her a long time
to convince the guy at the door that she ought to get it, but now
she has it held fast in her hand. It has her name on it, and a big
gold seal, and it says she is to be allowed to break in line. She
finds the right game, counts ten back from the head of the line, as
her pass instructs her to do, and prepares to step into the indi-
cated spot to begin what looks to be a lengthy wait. She lets out a
sigh. Her jaw allows itself an almost imperceptible degree of
slack. She is here. She has done it.
"Hey, you can't do that!" The newcomer feels herself
pushed back roughly, loses her balance and falls awkwardly to the
floor. Looking up she sees a wild figure standing over her. It is
apparently the person now just behind her in line. He is a white
man in his late thirties; he is wearing a dirty shirt with the sleeve
half torn. He is yelling at her, something about having been
standing in line since last Thursday, something about two sick
kids in the back room with his wife, something about the medicine
they've got to have. Suddenly his glance falls on the newcomer's
hand.
"Where the hell did you get those ten new bills?" he shouts.
"And what's that damn piece of paper with the seal on it? Are you
one of the ones they've been giving them out to at the door? I
heard about you!" The mood is getting uglier as several nearby
people overhear this "conversation," and edge over to get a word
in. They are muttering, and she wishes they didn't sound so omi-
nous, wishes she could convince herself that the "slut" and "nig-
ger" and "bitch" that she hears roll up from the low voices were
all just her paranoia.
One penetrating voice hisses above the rest, "I don't care
HOW she got her bills, she's not welcome here. She doesn't be-
long, and nobody can force her down our throats. I mean it."
The distraught man standing over Ashanna finds his voice
again. "My old man played this game for years, and his old man
before him. He promised me his place in line ever since I was a
kid. I know how to play this game with my eyes shut. Who do you
think you are, butting in here, anyhow? And where did you get
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that stinking note, and who gave you those bills?... Hey DOC!"
the man finally bellows, "It's not FAIR!"
As if in a dream, our newcomer remembers how she got here:
her mother's struggle in past years to gain admission to the party
met by repeated rejection, her grandfather's arm lost in an acci-
dent with the garbage truck out behind the party hall, half her
neighborhood on the streets since the old segregated plant they
used to work in had shut down, her own youngest home sick need-
ing medicine, and her with no helpmate to care for the child while
she is here. For a fleeting moment she thinks of trying to explain
all this, but her assailant, groggy from anger and worry and lack of
sleep, has a glazed look in his eye. Besides, a crowd is gathering,
and she knows it is not a friendly one. In the process of struggling
to her feet, she glances hastily around for help. To her chagrin,
she sees a number of people who appear to have no bills. They
are huddled in a comer, away from the lights, the music, the com-
fortable chairs, the banquet tables. "Who are they?" she won-
ders. So many of their faces are dark. So many are women and
children. Just then she feels the hand of one of the party givers on
her elbow, and hears him whisper in her ear, "It's all right. I've
got you covered. These guys are a bunch of rednecks."
"All right," his voice booms out authoritatively. "Break it up.
Settle down. Get back to the game. You know the party needs
these games. The games mean more bills for all of us." He
glances at Ashanna's angry attacker and says, "Calm down, now,
Joe. The Committee has reviewed the Rules. We talked it over
for a long time. After a lot of thought we've been forced to admit
that we agree with you. It just doesn't seem fair. None of you
people are responsible for what may have happened to her
mother or her grandfather or whatever. There will be no more
distributions at the door under these circumstances. But Joe, if
you cause another disruption like this again, I'm not sure I can let
you stay in line. You understand? And you.. ." (here he turns to
Ashanna) ".... absolutely no breaking in line. That's the Rule."
Before he strides off, his lips barely brush her ear as he whispers,
"I'm sure you understand-just look at the situation. It's for your
own good, really. We're having a little trouble upstairs, so we
need things to go smoothly down here. And these guys have had
it rough too, you know. Good luck at the game! We're glad to
have you aboard."
At first a hoarse cheer goes up from the angry crowd gath-
ered around the scene of conflict. "Hooray for Doc! And good
for you, Joe." A shy crooked grin plays fleetingly across Joe's
face, as he realizes he has won his point. He has always felt that
people ought to play by the Rules. But soon he and the others
realize they need to get back to business.
"Step right up," says the barker who manages the game at the
head of this particular line. The music swirls around them. The
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party goes on. The newcomer, her thoughts reeling, moves to the
back of the line, as those in front of her move ever so slightly, just
enough to keep that certain distance. Somewhere barely beyond
the periphery of consciousness Ashanna's mind resumes a fretful,
chronic, half-heard tune: rent, doctor bills, electricity, doctor, fur-
niture payment, rent, groceries, birthday, rent, doctor ... Noth-
ing gives. Meanwhile, her attacker hangs onto his precious spot,
runs rough fingers through his already rumpled hair, and glances
feverishly at the watch on his arm. His stomach is in knots. The
kids got their last dose of medicine two hours ago.
You recognize Joe, don't you? He is our Innocent Victim. But
victimized by what or by whom? And what about Ashanna? Is she
not a victim as well? What is to become of her?
2. The Innocent Victim Examined
We live in an economic system founded on inequality and our
legal system is centrally organized around justifying, explaining, and
legitimating that inequality. Consequently, those who come to the
legal system complaining of unequal conditions are fighting an in-
credibly strong force field.
The tactic of black people in the face of this reality has been to
show that their unequalness is different. It is a special, illegal kind of
unequalness that should be legally cured. This argument might
have worked. It actually did work a little. Although this matter is in
some doubt, I believe our legal and economic system might have
been willing and able to handle that kind of demand-if only the
debt were not so large and the available resources under such
pressure.
At present, however, we are forced to acknowledge that this tac-
tic has not worked. Society has not made reparations to black peo-
ple as a group. Much recent civil rights jurisprudence has
concerned itself largely with how to put credible limits on the genie
of race remediation once it escaped its bottle and once the magni-
tude of the debt became manifest. The "innocent victim" has be-
come an indispensable key to confining the genie, so he merits
further examination.
One is initially impressed with how late this innocent victim ar-
rived on the scene, or at least how late it was before he achieved
significant constitutional or other legal stature. In an earlier time,
courts that were asked to end or to remedy racist practices did not
give the "innocent victim" much more than the time of day. And
this is so despite the fact that ending racist practices and remedying
their effects has always upset the expectations of white "innocent vic-
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tims." One wonders why these expectations have become legally
significant only recently.
In Buchanan v. Warley,43 for example, the Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional a "checkerboard ordinance," which imposed
a pattern of mandatory racial segregation on all land acquisitions in
Louisville. The Court faced the argument that striking down this
ordinance would unfairly diminish the value of property held by
white property owners in the city. The Court rejected the argu-
ment, observing: "[iut is said that ... acquisitions by colored per-
sons depreciate property owned in the neighborhood by white
persons. But property may be acquired by undesirable white neigh-
bors or put to disagreeable though lawful uses with like results. '44
The Court was seemingly convinced that an owner's legal vulnera-
bility to whites undercut his claim to protection from blacks.
Similarly, white property owners in Shelley v. Kraemer45 pointed
out to the Court that if it did not uphold the always-heretofore-rec-
ognized racist covenants in their neighbors' deeds, their property
rights, long established under state common law, would be in-
fringed. The Court said simply, almost casually, that it found their
equal protection access-to-the-courts claim to be without merit.46
Whatever our present national consensus on the acceptability of ra-
cially restrictive convenants, such covenants once had substantial
economic value and represented well-settled expectations.
Likewise, in the days of Jim Crow, white people who lived in
that system had emotional, cultural and financial stakes in the con-
tinuation of a segregated way of life. Segregation had become a set-
tled expectation that, for most whites, represented their "chosen"
preference about everything from their children's schooling to the
environment they could expect in restaurants, movie theaters, pub-
lic transportation, and on thejob. From the point of view of blacks,
these arrangements may have looked unjust and bizarre. Of course,
the arrangements were unjust and bizarre. But they nevertheless
clearly represented settled expectations, and to many ordinary white
people these arrangements seemed natural and essential to their
fundamental rights to private property and personal liberty.47
Nevertheless, in Brown 1,48 despite a well-mounted defense of
43 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
44 Id. at 82.
45 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
46 Id at 22.
47 No less a figure than Hannah Arendt opposed the federal enforcement of school
desegregation. See Marie A. Failinger, Equality Versus the Right to Choose Associates: A Cri-
tique of HannahArendt's View of the Supreme Court's Dilemma, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 143 (1987).
Arendt apparently saw the issue as one of equality for blacks versus the associational
interests of white parents.
48 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
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white educational prerogatives, and despite recognition of the need
for "adjusting and reconciling public and private needs," 49 the
Supreme Court refused to back down from the requirement of de-
segregation. The Court noted that "it should go without saying that
the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to
yield simply because of disagreement with them." 50
To the extent that whites live in a racist society where power
and resources are allocated largely on the basis of skin color, they
inevitably have privileges and expectations based on these inequali-
ties. For example, white voters in the South were accustomed to
having disproportionate electoral power. When blacks began to
register and vote, they caused a real and concrete dilution of polit-
ical power of every individual white voter in the electorate. 51
Similarly, white male craft unionists who are used to handing
down their craft jobs to their sons as a "natural" part of life in their
craft will understandably think of their union as a family affair.
When newcomers of color are forced into this scene, even given pri-
ority over the sons of existing members, it destroys a strong and
dearly-held tradition. Nevertheless, the federal courts of appeals
have unflinchingly dismantled such expectations. 52 Likewise, in
abolishing dual seniority systems in a segregated plant and ordering
plant-wide seniority, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit felt unconstrained by the expectations of white.
workers:
We recognize [defendant's] point that changing the seniority
system may frustrate the expectations of employees who have es-
tablished departmental seniority .... Where some employees
now have lower expectations than their coworkers because of the
influence of one of these forbidden factors, they are entitled to
have their expectations raised even if the expectations of others
must be lowered in order to achieve the statutorily mandated
equality of opportunity.53
49 Id. at 300 (footnote omitted).
50 Id.
51 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-73bb-1 (1982). For eco-
nomically disadvantaged whites, black voting strength represents the potential for greater
empowerment of all poor people, including themselves. The struggle against the poll
tax, for instance, had a checkered career, but included support from groups cognizant
and critical not only of racial exclusion but also of the wide-spread underrepresentation
of poor and working-class whites and of women generally. See VIRGINIA DURR, OtrrsDE
THE MAGIC CIRCLE (H. Barnard ed. 1985).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Local Union 212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 472 F.2d
634 (6th Cir. 1973); Local 53 of the Int'l Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbes-
tos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfit-
ters Local Union No. 638 of V.A., 326 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).




When whites are used to having a disproportionate share of
municipal funds spent in their neighborhoods, while black neigh-
borhoods are allowed to languish, a requirement that city services
will be subject to equality review is unsettling. Whites as a group,
though no doubt unevenly, will either have to enjoy fewer services
or pay heavier taxes. Either way the new burden is undeniable. Yet
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not al-
low this concern to deter it from seeking equality.5 4
In short, while I believe that the right choices were made in the
Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act and in the cited deci-
sions, we need to recall that during the days of the early civil rights
advances the courts "trammeled" real interests55 and inflicted real
costs upon people who, although probably harboring racial preju-
dice, had probably not created the segregated schools themselves or
lobbied for racist ordinances. In fact, these injured people may have
done nothing more than inherit land or other social privileges in the
normal way. Still, the courts did not hesitate to rule that their ex-
pectations must give way in the interest of equality.
After the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,56 its chal-
lengers argued that the legislation unconstitutionally invaded pri-
vate liberty and property interests. The Supreme Court readily
disposed of their objections:
It is doubtful if in the long run appellant will suffer economic loss
as a result of the Act .... But whether this be true or not is of no
consequence since this Court has specifically held that the fact that a
"member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic
losses not shared by others.., has never been a barrier" to such
legislation.... [T]his Court has [similarly] rejected the claim that
the prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommodations
interferes with personal liberty. 57
This language is a far cry from the civil rights talk of courts in
the 1980s.58 A radical change has come about in the courts' willing-
54 See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
55 The allusion is to United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (the
Court stated, in this more recent civil rights case, that a dispositive issue for constitu-
tionality of an affirmative action plan is that it "does not unnecessarily trammel the inter-
ests of white employees").
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1982).
57 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 260 (1964) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
58 See infra notes 93-124 and accompanying text. Of course this specific passage
refers to the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, rather than the equal pro-
tection clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The different treatment accorded state action
under these two provisions is a subject of interest, but beyond the scope of this Article.
Has the ghost of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), long since banished from the
field of economic regulation, now come back to haunt us in "reverse discrimination"
jurisprudence?
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ness to impose burdens on whites in the process of ordering race
remediation from the days of the cited precedents to the contempo-
rary twilight of affirmative action jurisprudence. What is this shift
about?
A closer look at specific language in some opinions past and
present reveals interesting patterns. There has been a turn away
from an earlier language echoing with high public purpose, toward
a language of individual dispute; a turn away from a discourse call-
ing for a rally to common ideals, toward a discourse calling for the
management of competition among conflicting private claims and
entitlements. 59
I am not sure what to make of this, nor do I want to overstate
the case. Both kinds of language occur in both eras. I do not pro-
pose that "public" is always "good," and "private" is always
"bad."' 60 But the change in tone is clearly discernable and signifi-
cant. It indicates a more general drift in civil rights policy and in
popular consciousness about matters of race.
Too often in the eighties the courts and predominant political
discourse have ignored large questions or responsibility, interde-
pendence and transformation, instead emphasizing tight questions
of individual guilt or innocence. 6' They have shifted from halting
altruism to unvarnished individualism, 62 from an announced aspira-
tion of civic virtue to one of self-protection. 63
The relationship between judicial rhetoric on the one hand and
public opinion or popular consciousness on the other is surely com-
plex and uneven. My observation about a change in tone is not in-
tended as a statement of cause or effect. But the change is striking
enough to call for examination.
The following excerpts from civil rights cases give some flavor
of the two dictions I have identified. In earlier cases, despite plenty
of equitable balancing, despite discernable efforts by courts to tone
things down (one presumes exactly because sweeping changes were
59 See infra notes 64-122 and accompanying text.
60 For sketchy hints of the twistings of the public/private distinction in civil rights
law, see infra note 124 and accompanying text. See also Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Indus-
trial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights
Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982).
61 See Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986). Recent cases accentuate this trend. See Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
62 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976).
63 Civic virtue (an amalgam of the qualities that allow persons to come together as a
political collectivity and engage in high-quality deliberative communication and deci-
sion-making for and about the common good) is valued in the republican vision and is




being ordered), the opinions frequently convey the sense that a high
social project is underway. The following phrases should give some
sense of what I mean:
"nationwide importance of the decision .... ,64
"urgent concern to the entire country .... "65
"The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish
the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the
electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century ....
[I]t persists on a pervasive scale."'66
"insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated...
through unremitting and ingenious defiance." 67
"After enduring nearly a century of widespread resistance...
Congress has marshalled an array of potent weapons against the
evil.... Hopefully, millions of non-white Americans will now be
able to participate for the first time on an equal basis in the gov-
ernment under which they live." 68
"[School boards are bound] to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimina-
tion would be eliminated root and branch.... The constitutional
rights of Negro school children articulated in Brown I permit no
less than this."' 69
"Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of
Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before
the Act. ' 70
"[T]he record.., is replete with evidence of the burdens that
discrimination by race or color places upon interstate com-
merce .... [O]ur people have become increasingly mobile with
millions of people of all races traveling from State to State;...
Negroes in particular have been the subject of discrimination...
and ... these conditions had become ... acute .... These exclu-
sionary practices were found to be nationwide... [and] indicated
a qualitative as well as quantitative effect on interstate travel by
Negroes." 7 1
These cases talk of "millions," of "entire generation[s]," of
"root and branch" commitments, of "nationwide" effects and ef-
forts. The affirmative action cases, however, more often speak the
language of private dispute, of one-on-one conflicts of interest. The
infusion of such private law language into civil rights cases is re-
64 Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
65 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966).
66 Id at 308.
67 Id. at 309.
68 Id at 337.
69 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (citations omitted).
70 Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (1968).
71 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (citations
omitted).
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markable. Once in place, this diction begins to affect law-trained
and law-conditioned readers. It evokes a whole series of ideas and
notions about how things "like this" (i.e., individual conflicts be-
tween private rights-bearing self-interested units) ought to be re-
solved. 72 Similarly, when lawyers begin to think of race remediation
in private law terms, it excludes from our vision many larger, trans-
individual social problems, as well as many social solutions that are
not established parts of private law norms, despite the fact that
those problems and solutions may well be part of our past reality
and future possibility.
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 73 exemplifies a case poised
on the fulcrum of this shift from public to private. In Franks, an
employment discrimination case, the Supreme Court found that an
award of retroactive competitive seniority74 was a presumptively
necessary form of relief for "identifiable victims"' 75 of illegal hiring
discrimination, despite the ambiguous language and complex legis-
lative history of Title VII's partial immunization of "bona fide" sen-
iority systems. 7 6 The majority opinion is full of public language. 7 7
72 In a different context Karl Klare has noted:
The leading theorists of collective bargaining law have in large part
based their work on an analogy between governance of the workplace and
governance of society. This way of thinking has naturally inclined labor
lawyers to import the vocabulary of constitutionalism into their work.
Analogizing collective bargaining to law making and treating collectively
bargained plant operating procedures as an "industrial rule of law"
caused the reproduction within labor law of the categories, problems,
and inflections of liberal theory.
Karl Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1359
(1982).
73 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
74 "Benefits" seniority entitles the worker to certain benefits from the employer,
whether they be fringe benefits or wages. "Competitive" seniority, on the other hand,
entitles the worker to a certain "place in line" relative to fellow workers. It comes into
play when an incumbent wants to bid on a job, bump another worker from a particular
job or shift, and-usually by far the most crucial-withstand the threat of a lay-off. Com-
petitive seniority, however, is not entirely a matter between and among the workers
themselves.
Seniority of either kind is worth nothing at common law, where freedom of contract
and employment-at-will theories reigned before the advent of statutory labor law. Com-
petitive seniority is a hard-fought and much-prized achievement of the labor movement.
It serves as a bulwark against employer favoritism, protecting individuals against arbi-
trary treatment, and also protecting their ability to organize collectively. It severely re-
stricts the employer's power to punish leaders or to use workers against each other in
the day-to-day struggle over working conditions and relative bargaining power.
Therefore, seniority should be recognized as mediating both the relationship of one
worker to other workers and the relationship of workers collectively with their employer.
No discussion of seniority is realistic if it fails to take this important dimension into
account. Civil rights scholars should recognize that while seniority is often a matter of
skin color privilege, it is also a matter of class.
75 Franks, 424 U.S. at 774.
76 Id. at 757-62.
77 See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
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In counterpoint, the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Franks78 provide one of the first occasions on which our Innocent
Victim can be heard, rustling about in the wings, getting ready for
his starring role in subsequent affirmative action cases. We thus find
in Franks both styles of discourse side by side.
The employer in Franks argued that victims 79 should not receive
retroactive competitive seniority because such an award "will con-
flict with the economic interests of other Bowman employees."'8 0
The majority makes short shrift of the argument, noting:
[W]e find untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be
denied merely because the interests of other employees may
thereby be affected. "If relief ... can be denied merely because
the majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimi-
nation, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of cor-
recting the wrongs to which the Act is directed." 81
The dissent criticizes the Court's result as not sufficiently cogni-
zant that it will
directly implicate the rights and expectations of perfectly innocent
employees. We are of the view, however, that the result which we
reach today-which, standing alone, establishes that a sharing of
the burden of the past discrimination is presumptively neces-
sary-is entirely consistent with any fair characterization of equity
jurisdiction, particularly when considered in light of our tradi-
tional view that "[a]ttainment of a great national policy.., must
not be confined within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed
suitable by chancellors in ordinary private controversies.8 2
Certainly there is no argument that the award of retroactive
seniority to the victims of hiring discrimination in any way de-
prives other employees of indefeasibly vested rights conferred by
the employment contract. This Court has long held that em-
ployee expectations arising from a seniority system agreement
may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public policy in-
terest. The Court has also held that a collective-bargaining agree-
ment may go further, enhancing the seniority status of certain
employees for purposes of furthering public policy interests be-
yond what is required by statute, even though this will to some
extent be detrimental to the expectations acquired by other em-
78 See Franks, 424 U.S. at 780 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 781 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79 The argument included "identifiable" victims, those odd birds who have gradu-
ally acquired substantial entitlements, even as membership in their talismanic ranks has
narrowed.
80 Franks, 424 U.S. at 773.
81 Id. at 775 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663
(2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted)).
82 Id. at 777-78 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941)
(citations and footnotes omitted)).
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ployees under the previous seniority agreement.8 3
In this opinion we continue to hear the public tone, the voice of
"great national policy,"8 4 "strong public policy,"8 5 and "public pol-
icy interests."8 6 ChiefJustice Burger's and Justice Powell's dissents,
however, usher in a new discourse, a new point of view. Burger
begins:
[C]ompetitive-type seniority relief at the expense of wholly inno-
cent employees can rarely, if ever, be equitable .... In every
respect an innocent employee is comparable to a "holder-in-due-
course" of negotiable paper or a bona fide purchaser of property
without notice of any defect in the seller's title.87
Powell stresses that courts must be very concerned about "perfectly
innocent employees"88 and "other workers' legitimate expecta-
tions."89 For the first time we are exposed to the amazing line of
reasoning that is soon to become commonplace:
(1) The incumbent worker is "innocent," so burdens of past dis-
crimination should not be put on him;
(2) But it is okay to let the burden remain on the victim of
83 Id. at 778 (citations omitted).
84 Id. at 778-79 (citation omitted).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 780-81 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88 Id. at 788 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Elsewhere I
have noted the irony that the "perfectly innocent employee" should get his first bit part
in Franks, because when, (at least according to the employer), it was the refusal of white
drivers to share cabs or showers with black drivers that "necessitated" the discrimina-
tion in the first place. See Note, Cost Allocation in Title VII Remedies: Who Pays for Past
Employment Discrimination?, 44 TENN. L. REv. 347, 366 n.89 (1977) (authored by Frances
Lee Ansley).
I do not suggest that we should deal with the "innocent victim" by exposing him as
"guilty" in discrete instances like this one, though such a task would often prove easy
enough to accomplish. Nor does it make sense to say that employment security for
blacks should hinge on whether they can prove overt bigotry among incumbent employ-
ees. That has no more logic than the current rule, whereby white incumbents'job secur-
ity may hinge on whether their employer has overtly or "egregiously" discriminated in
the past. Compare Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (incumbents'
expectations protected) with United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (incumbents'
expectations thwarted).
Fueling any white person's notion that she is entirely free of benefit from or respon-
sibility for white supremacy is a disservice. All whites benefit in some ways and we are all
responsible. Some are more responsible than others. See infra notes 295-96 and accom-
panying text for one idea (a "burdensharing" project) of how to approach the question
of differential responsibility.
89 Franks, 424 U.S. at 791. 1 find myself particularly aware in this instance-perhaps
because of the jarring juxtaposition of the two levels of discourse-of the Legal Realist
attack on this line of reasoning. Isn't it the Court's very actions that in large part deter-
mine what workers' "legitimate expectations" will be during the unprecedented process
of attempting to undo three hundred years of vicious subjugation of one race to an-
other? See Robert H. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. ScL. Q. 470 (1923).
[Vol. 74:9931018
1989] CIVIL RIGHTS SCHOLARSHIP 1019
discrimination;9 0
(3) And it is all right to ignore the option of putting the burden
on the employer.91
Since Franks, the innocent victim has taken center stage, and the
language of private law has begun to dominate the cases. Below are
some examples of "private law talk." The phrases and sentences
obviously are taken out of context. I quote them not to comment on
the situated and individual meaning of each, but to highlight the
diction emerging in this line of cases. Suddenly we find ourselves
out of the land of civil rights, and back in the land of private law.
The turns of phrase and logic are frequently those of traditional
contract, tort, and property jurisprudence. We find ourselves con-
cerned with concepts of fault, with causation, with proof of particu-
lar injury to the particular plaintiff, with notions of consent and free
will, with carefully drawn damages, and with "legitimate" expecta-
tions.92 We also find much concern for protecting private spheres
from public intrusion.
From United Steelworkers v. Weber :9
90 The rule as it has evolved, of course, is not quite as strong as this. After all, the
majority in Franks did prevail. The present rule is that if the victim of discrimination is
"identifiable" it is presumptively not permissible to place all the seniority burden on
him. However, where an affirmative action beneficiary is not the individual victim of a
discrete prior incident of discrimination by the particular employer involved, the rule
governing court-imposed relief is narrower, and the loss falls on the victim. Of course,
on the private law analysis the "unidentifiable" victim is really no victim at all, having
suffered nothing that this analysis calls relevant "discrimination."
This reluctance to recognize the realities of societal discrimination is one of the
greatest failings of current civil rights law, and is intimately tied to its privatization.
Blacks still suffer tremendous cumulative disadvantages and are clearly victimized by the
prevalence of racism in society. Each black person is concretely injured by discrimina-
tion against others, because her own experience, as well as other people's perceptions of
her, are conditioned and limited by what happens to her sisters and brothers of color.
91 To give ChiefJustice Burger his due, he did suggest such an option. Willing to
follow the logic of his Holder-in-Due-Course analogy, he proposed letting the victim
have his remedy against the "Thief," in the form of some kind of front pay arrangement
from the employer. Franks, 424 U.S. at 781. I take it that this was the root of his differ-
ence with Powell and Rehnquist, who joined in a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Some lower courts, like Burger, have explicitly rejected step three in the above line
of reasoning, and have suggested that employers shoulder some costs. In McAleer v.
A.T. & T., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976), for instance, Judge Gesell awarded the job
standing (in that case a promotion) to the affirmative action candidate, but also awarded
damages for the lost raise to the skipped-over plaintiff, on the theory that it was not he,
but the employer, who should take responsibility for past discrimination. This solution
is clearly preferable because it furthers our common interest in an integrated work force,
by requiring the employer to share costs with the women excluded in the past and the
men (temporarily?) held back by the present remedy.
92 See Christopher Edley, Affirmative Action and the Rights Rhetoric Trap, 3 HARV.
BLACKLErrERJ. 9 (1986) for some discussion of the tensions and inadequacies of com-
mon law liability frameworks in this context.
93 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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"... voluntarily adopted by private parties...
"[L]egislators demanded .. .that 'management prerogatives ...
be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.' -95
"Congress did not intend to limit traditional business
freedom .... ,,96
"[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white
employees." 97
"[The] plan falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to
the private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action .... 98
From Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts:99
agreement of the parties . . ."100
... purpose or intent to discriminate..."101
"[E]ach individual must prove that the discriminatory practice had
an impact on him. .... ,,102
"... certainty of obligation...-lo3
"[T]hey waived their right to seek further relief. . ."04
"... hold [] respondents to the bargain they struck. .. 105
From Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland:0 6
"... voluntary compliance.., the preferred means ...-107
"... consent decrees . . .closely resemble contracts"' 0 8
"[W]hen it enacted Title VII ... Congress was particularly con-
cerned to avoid undue federal interference with managerial
discretion." 10 9
"[N]one of the whites denied promotion was shown to have been
responsible or in any way implicated in the discriminatory prac-
tices recited in the decree." 10
"[T]he ... union.., never consented to the decree at all."'
From United States v. Paradise:"12
94 Id. at 201.
95 Id. at 206 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 29 (1963)).
96 Id. at 207.
97 Id at 208.
98 Id. at 209.
99 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
100 Id. at 575-76.
101 Id. at 577.
102 Id at 579.
103 Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
107 Id. at 515.
108 Id. at 519.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 535 (White, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 537 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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"[This] ... does not 'impose the entire burden of achieving racial
equality on particular individuals,' and does not disrupt seriously
the lives of innocent individuals." 113
"... protection of the rights of nonminority workers . . .-114
FromJohnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California:115
"[P]etitioner had no absolute entitlement.. .- 116
"[D]enial of the promotion unsettled no legitimate firmly rooted
expectation ... ."1 17
"... potential for intrusion on males and nonminorities..." 1 18
"... Congress' concern in Title VII to avoid 'undue federal inter-
ference with managerial discretion' "119
".... effects of the affirmative action plan for black employees on
the employment opportunities of white employees...,120
". conflicting concerns of minority and nonminority workers
"121
"[T]he 88th Congress did not wish to intrude too deeply into pri-
vate employment decisions." 122
The language of privatization is related to two destructive phenom-
ena. First, it is part of a reduction in our aspirations from a vision of
an interrelated community to one of isolated and barricaded selves.
Implicit in this reduction is the idea that race discrimination is now
an episodic matter, where the Court's proper purpose is to detect
and remedy the isolated, exceptional, highly individual case that will
occasionally arise. 123
Second, the reduction from public to private is part of a more
complex development. It lowers-the focus of discourse from the
level of public social decision to that of private conflict, but in addi-
tion it shifts our attention from one set of private relationships to
another. The new discourse most frequently casts the relevant par-
ties not as the excluding employer versus the black aspirant, but as
the black aspirant versus the innocent white incumbent. Accord-
ingly, the new style results not only in reduction from public to pri-
113 Id. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 283 (1986)).
114 Id. at 199 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
116 Id. at 638.
117 Id.
118 Ida at 640.
119 Id. at 645 (Stevens,J., concurring) (quoting Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefight-
ers v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986)).
120 Id. at 649-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 650.
122 Id. at 669 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123 For an extended discussion of the power of the individualist ideal and the strong
tension between that ideal and affirmative action, see Andrea Giampetro & Nancy
Kubasek, Individualism in America and its Implications for Affirmative Action, 14 J. CoNTEMP. L.
165 (1988).
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vate, but in a radical misalignment of the parties.' 24 It allows us to
refuse to end the conditions of white supremacy while portraying
the refusal as a valiant defense of a powerless underdog. Such a
stance is comfortable for white Americans, who typically cherish
both prerogatives and commitment to a democratic ideal.
Too often modern affirmative action doctrine invites us to mis-
perceive the basic problem. In some instances the cases are treated
as a private contest for scarce resources between a white and a black
worker125 who are fundamentally selfish, at odds, and in need of
regulation by a neutral and superior force. In other instances the
picture is of an embattled white, male worker in need of protection
from an overbearing and intrusive government or employer (often
in cahoots with greedy, non-Victimized, "minimally qualified" mi-
norities or women). 26 In other instances the protagonist is
presented as a benign and well-meaning corporation who simply
needs some flexibility and general guidelines to insulate it from the
selfish demands of shortsighted child-like workers, so that the cor-
poration can go about its business of responsibly allocating fixed
resources among the rival siblings in the workplace family. 127
I believe the real picture is radically different. Workers are not
selfish children who must always be told from above who wins and
who loses. They are adults with abilities, who, if given the opportu-
124 A look at the ways American statutory and common law have worked to "mis-
align" blacks and whites is beyond the scope of this Article, but would nonetheless be
fascinating. Judge Higginbotham reports that under certain colonial statutes both black
and white indentured servants were subject to stiffer punishments if they ran away
"biracially" than if they made segregated escape attempts. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN
THE MATrER OF COLOR 34 (1978). Miscegenation laws worked to keep interracial sex
extra-legal and primarily a matter of white male privilege. The infamous statutes that
severely restricted manumission, but allowed an owner to grant freedom to a black in
exchange for the latter informing on fellow slaves who planned escape or revolt pushed
blacks away from solidarity with other blacks and toward collaboration with slaveholding
whites. Id. at 48.
125 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). For a discussion of
"zero-sum game" theory, inter alia, see Williams, supra note 15, at 1128-32.
126 See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 575 (1984) (hold-
ing that "it is inappropriate to deny an innocent employee the benefits of his seniority in
order to provide a remedy [for past discriminatory practices]"); cf. Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (recognizing that sometimes "innocent" persons must
bear some remedial burdens). This man-against-the-monster picture is particularly gall-
ing when minorities are essentially written out of the equation. The most damaged vic-
tims are thus rendered invisible. Scholars have launched excellent critiques of the Bakke
litigation and its often highly questionable process on these grounds, and have hopefully
prepared civil rights scholars to be watchful for such exclusion and silencing in the fu-
ture. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1979).
127 See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 210 (concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun
highlights the employer's dilemma when it faces "liability for past discrimination against
blacks ... and liability to whites for any voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate the
effects of prior discrimination against blacks").
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nity to participate in hard management decisions, have the capacity
to fashion creative and equitable solutions for all kinds of problems
facing them and their employers, even those involving explosive is-
sues of race.1 28 Though resources are not unlimited, and concern
about their division is therefore justified, there is, nevertheless, al-
ready enough for all. The more important and powerful conflict is not
the one between a black worker and a white worker, but the conflict
between all poor and working people on the one hand and those
who manage and profit from the economy on the other.
Costs associated with race remediation should be borne primar-
ily by the people and institutions most responsible for the original
injury and most able to institute lasting social changes. Further, a
community facing up to the legacy of a racist past and moving to-
ward increased security for all in need will find it more politically
acceptable to ask all of its members to pull its share.
My criticism of contemporary affirmative action rhetoric is
therefore two-fold. First, that rhetoric reinforces and valorizes the
idea that our response to profound and deep-rooted post dejure in-
equities can and should be seen as a matter of individual entitle-
ments and respect for vestedness, rather than as a matter for social
and political responsibility and generous vision. Second, it mis-
aligns the parties, obfuscating some crucial conflicts and solutions
and destructively exaggerating others.
In Part IV of this Article I will suggest a few directions that
scholars might explore to begin forging a better affirmative action
doctrine, one that could be fair and empowering for both Joe and
Ashanna. Before doing so, however, I want to take a larger view.
What lies behind the distressing state of affirmative action doctrine?
III
"How HAVE WE FAILED-AND WHY?"
Civil rights scholars have offered various analyses to explain the
development of the civil rights movement, civil rights litigation, and
civil rights legal doctrine. Implicit in these analyses are different
ideas about the nature of racism. In asking how and why the ex-
isting system of racial dominance and subordination has survived
the powerful waves of opposition and resistance that have broken
upon it, scholars have necessarily confronted, directly or indirectly,
128 For a number of provocative explorations of workers and community residents
as local and regional planners, see Labor Tackles the Local Economy: Reindustrializa-
tion from Below, Vol. 9, Labor Research Review (Midwest Center for Labor Research:
Chicago). For a description of how rank-and-file unionists and community activists
might approach designing a plan for equitably modernizing, even closing, plant capacity
in a major corporation, see ERIC MANN, TAKING ON GENERAL MOTORS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE UAW CAMPAIGN TO KEEP GM VAN Nuys OPEN 365-94 (1987).
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the question of white supremacy's origin in America and what makes
it tick.
I intend to develop two possible models of white supremacy: 129
the "class" model and the "race" model. In many arguments and
conversations of my own, and running through published civil rights
scholarship, the themes, tensions and ambiguities of race and class
are pervasive.130 Of course under the regime of non-American chat-
tel slavery, race and class were virtually one and the same. Not all
slave societies have been built on white supremacy, but ours was.
Slaves were, by definition, an economic class and (after some ambi-
guity in colonial beginnings) slaves were, by definition, "black."'u3
However, with emancipation, and more completely with the end of
dejure segregation, race and class have taken on more complex and
divergent meanings.
When I discuss the "class model," I use "class" to mean a
group defined by its relationship to economic power and resources.
129 By "white supremacy" I do not mean to allude only to the self-conscious racism
of white supremacist hate groups. I refer instead to a political, economic and cultural
system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious
and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and rela-
tions of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a
broad array of institutions and social settings.
A few years ago I probably would have called this system "institutionalized racism."
Today, however, in an era of so-called "color-blindness," when "racism" can mean the
disfavoring of a white person for the most transitory and isolated purpose, I believe
white supremacy to be the more helpful and accurate term. While not denying that a
system of black supremacy is conceivable in the abstract, the term "white supremacy"
reminds us that the institutional racism of our place and epoch (our planet?) has been a
racism of white over black. To my mind, any jurisprudence or politics of racial justice
that fails to recognize and incorporate this overwhelming reality has missed the boat.
(See discussion of anti-subordination and anti-subjugation, infra notes 267-86 and ac-
companying text.)
Therefore, my choice of words is made with an eye toward helping us consciously
situate ourselves in reality. The term "white supremacy" is emphatically not used here to
inflate rhetoric, or to deny that some forms of white supremacy are more virulent than
others. The white supremacy in the United States today is better than what we had in
1855 or 1919, and better than the white supremacy that presently reigns in South Africa.
On the other hand, I fail to see how Americans can avoid recognizing that we still live in
a white supremacist system.
130 See, e.g., Kimberl Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). Professor Cren-
shaw's article appeared after this one was written. Readers moved by the issues raised
here should consult her important piece.
131 The quotation marks serve only as a reminder that race is a social convention
rather than a biologically definable fact. The laws governing the definition of who was
to be considered black in slavery days are only one of the more graphic demonstrations
of race's social construction. See, e.g., WINTHROP JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN:
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1974). For an example of home-
made judicial theorizing on racial identity, see Hudgins v. Wrights, 1 Va. (1 Hen. & M.)
134 (1806). See generally A. Leon Higginbotham & Barbara Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967 (1989).
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I presume that people of all races may be included in a given class,
that they may, for instance, share the position of having no legal
access to socially productive property without the consent of others
and of having to exchange their labor for a livelihood or depend
upon benefits from the welfare state. When I discuss the "race
.model," I use "race" to mean a group defined socially by physical
characteristics or genetic heritage. I presume that people within
that group may hold different class positions. These presumptions
may well prove inadequate for some purposes, but they provide a
starting point.
This exercise tries to imagine two polar theories that offer op-
posing explanations, that strongly "take sides" in this conversation,
and then tries to examine society from each theory's point of view.
This tactic suffers from all the problems of over-simplification and
false polarization that artificial categories entail. I hope, however,
that the categories help to highlight common and differing threads
in arguments and proposals currently offered by civil rights scholars
and help identify some of the choices confronting lawyers and
others interested in fighting racial injustice.
A. White Supremacy as a Feature of Class Domination
The "class model" of white supremacy portrays white
supremacy as primarily a means to justify and enhance class domi-
nance and thus to strengthen existing relations of economic power.
According to the class model, this function gives racism its central
status in American political life and motivates those in power to as-
sure its survival. This is the source of racism's strength and resili-
ence. The class model addresses the fact that in a white supremacist
system, the poor people of all races so often come out on the short
end while the people of the dominant classes so often appear to ex-
tract extraordinary benefits.
Within the class model I describe two variants. Both focus on
economic class relations as the prime explanation for modern white
supremacy. But these (stylized and overdrawn) variants also differ
in important ways.
I call the first variation the "class domination model." 3 2 It sees
racism as an economic tool of the dominant classes, a secondary and
derivative adjunct to class rule, to efficient generation of profit and
to control of the economic apparatus. This model, for instance, de-
picts white supremacy as a method for assuring the existence of a
reserve army of labor. Minorities are forced into a marginal under-
132 See generally Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14 (arguing that antidiscrimina-
tion laws have been used more to rationalize continued discrimination than to solve the
problem).
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class. This cuts them off from their natural class allies and makes
them vulnerable to abuses and economic manipulation.
The class domination model offers the insight that this system
of super-exploitation sanctions extra profit but, equally importantly,
creates an underclass that can be summoned, moved, or rebuffed
almost at will, thereby facilitating the mobility of capital and improv-
ing the system's ability to control and channel investment. Eco-
nomic realities such as the great migrations of black labor earlier in
this century, the marginal character of many black jobs, the high
unemployment among minorities and the low wages of many people
of color support this picture of white supremacy.133
The class domination model has a "political face" in addition to
its economic one. Its political aspect points out that white
supremacy not only allows super-exploitation of blacks, but also
blocks potential class-based action by splitting the working class. It
is axiomatic that exploited classes divided against each other have
less power compared to the relatively united exploiting classes. The
constant reminder to whites that others are willing to work for less
(because they are forced) makes minority workers into a helpful in-
strument of discipline to be used against their relatively privileged
white counterparts. Concrete historical examples confirm that a di-
vide-and-conquer pattern can and does exist. The frequent use of
blacks as strike-breakers during Jim Crow days and the well-known
contributions of racism to breaking unions in the South and else-
where are two obvious instances where this dynamic has been at
work.
Under a class domination model one would expect racist struc-
tures to change if conditions changed so as to make them unhelpful
in maintaining economic relationships. As a matter of logic, the
class domination model does not require a vision of white
supremacy as inevitably and inextricably linked to the class system.
Its link could be contingent and dependent on how valuable a tool
of class domination or legitimation it was turning out to be. This
contingent view would require that any opponent of white
supremacy achieve a sophistication about the workings of the eco-
nomic system and how that system uses and exploits people of
color. On the other hand, it would allow such a person to remain
essentially agnostic about the underlying class system itself, as long
as that person could perceive some dynamic that promised to dis-
133 Students in my discrimination course discovered during interviews with local citi-
zens that virtually the entire black population of a nearby town was imported from the
Deep South in the 1930s and 1940s to work at the hottest, dirtiest jobs in the plant at a
wage that white workers had refused.
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connect the class structure from the race structure.'3 4
Further, if such a disconnection appeared as a present possibil-
ity, and if one had decided to remain uncommitted on the "class
question," then it might very well make just as much sense to look to
the dominant classes for relief as to look to whites in the working
class to shed their racism and join an alliance. Some interpretations
of the civil rights movement, in fact, explain it precisely as an alli-
ance between the "leading edge" of the dominant white classes in
America and aspiring middle class elements in the black
community. 135
As changes have occurred in our economy and in public opin-
ion, civil rights scholars have found cause for both hope and fear. A
deep shift away from industrial production, increasing automation
of everything from agricultural to clerical work, and a decrease in
the domestic demand for unskilled labor, are trends that make the
old economic uses of racial oppression look less and less functional.
The effectiveness of race as a dividing wedge has certainly not disap-
peared, but it has changed. For example, overt bigotry, despite its
resilience and undeniable presence among us, has suffered signifi-
cant blows in popular consciousness as a result of the civil rights
struggle.' 36
Meanwhile, the costs of racism to our system have dramatically
increased since the close of World War II. These costs include do-
mestic unrest and damage to our national prestige in a post-Nazi,
Cold War, and decolonizing world. The fate of blacks in this coun-
try has been an international question since the American slave
trade began, but we have often lost sight of that dimension.13 7
134 Whether or not our hypothetical anti-racist would favor agnosticism and disen-
gagement on questions of class may depend, at least in part, on her own class position
(or perhaps on the class position she might reasonably anticipate if racial barriers fell
and people of color were arrayed across the class spectrum in the same proportions as
whites).
Thus, white professionals deeply opposed to racial discrimination might feel rela-
tively unconcerned with non-racial disparities of power and resources, believing them to
be less inhumane or degrading, or perhaps natural, or simply not so bad. Similarly, a
black person committed to fighting racism might feel quite differently about non-racial
matters of power and privilege depending on whether she was an auto worker, a welfare
mother, an attorney, or an aspiring junior executive.
135 Adolph Reed speaks of "an elite brokerage relation [of black civil rights leaders]
with powerful whites outside the South." RACE, POLITICS & CULTURE, supra note 5, at 71;
see also id. at 67. It is painfully obvious that Martin Luthur King, Jr. was trying to forge
very different alliances and directions for the civil rights movement at the time of his
assassination.
136 Of course, racism is not the only ideology that divides. Numerous other belief-
clusters and attitudes appear to function in this way: sexism, consumerism, religious
intolerance, anti-communism, homophobia, fear of personal economic disaster, xeno-
phobia-all these are powerful and have real effects in our society.
137 For an eye-opening first look at the link between civil rights and anti-communism
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Civil rights scholars have noted these changes and have drawn
different conclusions about them. Adolph Reed recognizes the al-
tering landscape but still pictures economic realities as the driving
force behind race policy, noting:
[T]he castelike organization of southern society seriously in-
hibited development of a rational labor supply. While much has
been made of the utility of the segregated work force as a depres-
sant of general wage levels, maintenance of dual labor markets
creates a barrier to labor recruitment .... Given this state of af-
fairs, the corporate elite's support for an antisegregationist initia-
tive makes sense. 138
Sidney Willhelm sees the change in economic conditions as evi-
dence of a worse fate for blacks who, rather than being liberated, are
now expendable: "[B]lack labor is no longer necessary to economic
needs of capitalism or for the state economy; black people are in-
creasingly becoming superfluous. . ... 139 Willhelm continues,
"[T]here is no white need for blacks .... [We are now confronted
with] an economy of uselessness."' 140
On the other hand, some civil rights scholars have found hope
in the changing geopolitical pressures and in the rising costs of
white supremacy to those in power. For example, as Derrick Bell
notes, the NAACP argued to the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education14 ' that visible race remediation would help the United
States defeat Communism in the war "for the hearts and minds of
Third World people ... .," 142 Their arguments clearly expressed the
hope that racism and our economic system could be uncoupled.
in the pre-Brown era, see Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 61 (1988).
138 Reed, supra note 24, at 65-66.
139 Bell, Hurdle, supra note 16, at 25 (Sidney Willhelm speaking).
140 Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted).
141 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
142 D. BELL, supra note 3, at 62. In similar fashion, the government's brief in Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), cited infant provisions of 1940s international human
rights law in urging the Supreme Court to outlaw enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants in deeds to real property. See Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at
97-98, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Nos. 72, 87, 290, 291).
One episode of the television documentary Eyes on the Prize, supra note 18, makes this
point graphically. The narrator recounts the history of the desegregation campaign in
Birmingham, which culminated in mass demonstrations. The camera moves from foot-
age of the demonstrations to a sequence of photographs and articles published at that
time in the international press featuring children being attacked with dogs and fire hoses
under the direction of then police chief Bull Connor. Following this montage, the
viewer watches Alabama Governor George Wallace's reaction to the international cover-
age. While the governor vociferously maintains supreme unconcern about world opin-
ion, we are led to the firm conclusion that worry about the "outside world" provided
protest leaders with important leverage for change. See also Dudziak, supra note 137.
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They tried to persuade the Court that such an uncoupling would
serve the long-term interests of the existing order.
At any rate, a number of developments challenge the class dom-
ination model. Traditional benefits of white supremacy appear to
be waning while costs increase. Meanwhile, during recent decades
of civil rights struggle, many members of dominant elites have
aligned themselves with the opponents of old-style racism. How
then does one explain the continued force of racial division?
The class domination model's answer questions the "obsoles-
cence" notion itself. In its view, the economic system still needs,
and will continue to defend, white supremacy, particularly when the
global economy is taken into account. 143 Regardless of whether
class and race could ever be disconnected, they show no signs of
being so to date. The role of color in producing and assuring sizea-
ble stable profits for those in a position to enjoy capturing them is
hardly over. We may have witnessed a change in white supremacy,
but not its withering away, and certainly not the end of its economic
usefulness. 144
The race model gives a second answer, which I will discuss at
some length in the next section.145 The race model argues that
143 One of the "traditional benefits" noted above was the increased labor mobility
that results from maintenance of a group of super-exploited laborers in the workforce.
The dazzling increase in capital mobility displayed in our global economy today may
mean that labor mobility is now less important. Capital can come to the worker-in
Korea, in Singapore, in the maquiladora belt along the U.S.-Mexican border. Perhaps
this alters some of the old equations. On the other hand, racialism still plays an impor-
tant role in shaping our attitudes and policies toward third world labor, and in keeping
people divided from each other.
144 Derrick Bell insists on the importance of blacks as a kind of ace in the hole for
the dominant classes. He sees racism as a valuable splitting mechanism in reserve, even
though it may occasionally fade from view or sink into disuse. "[B]lacks ... serve as the
society's involuntary sacrifice on those all-too-rare occasions when whites awaken to the
facts that they, too, are being exploited in this land of supposed equal opportunity."
Bell, Hurdle, supra note 16, at 28 (Derrick Bell speaking). In his view, then, the explana-
tory force of the class domination model would not rise or fall with temporary changes
in the usefulness of racism.
145 See infra notes 214-30 and accompanying text. Sidney Willhelm's nightmare vi-
sion contemplates a convergence of class and race explanations:
There is a big debate over the autonomy of racism. Some argue that
it is a reflection of economic forces, a component of the capitalist system.
Others contend that it is a force in its own right and not a reflection of the
dynamics of capitalism.
Clearly, it has to be dealt with in the capitalist system, and if the
economy is now forcing blacks out, racism is a force that will push whites
to exterminate blacks. In that event, blacks will be like the Indians, free
only to go to their ghettos, reside there, and not resist. They will then be
tolerated until, of course, some sort of economic resource is discovered
on the ghetto-reservations.
Bell, Hurdle, supra note 16, at 29 (Sidney Willhelm speaking).
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white supremacy's staying power derives from something other than
the class structure.
A third answer arises from a different version of the class
model, which I will call the "class legitimation model." Alan Free-
man suggests this version in two seminal and overlapping essays
published in the early 1980s.146
Freeman first expresses strong doubt that white supremacy is
any longer of significant material aid to dominant classes: "That
racism persists (perhaps as a virulent ideological plague from the
past) does not make it per se economically functional .... It does
seem questionable whether racism of the kind traditionally exper-
ienced by black Americans remains necessary to support capitalist
exploitation or is even useful for that enterprise."' 147
Despite this vision of white supremacy as a sort of anachronistic
societal appendix, Freeman nevertheless argues that its endurance
is based on "needs basic to the preservation of the class struc-
ture. . . ,,t48 But the vision that Freeman then presents of this
"class structure" and its "needs" is more complex than the racism-
as-tool instrumentalism of the first version of the class model sug-
gested above. 149
146 Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 96-116; Alan Freeman, Race and Class:
The Dilemma of Liberal Reform (Book Review), 90 YALE LJ. 1880 (1981) [hereinafter Free-
man, Race and Class]. Since this Article was written, Freeman has published another arti-
cle explicitly and movingly treating many of the issues I attempt to engage here. See
Freeman, Racism, Rights, supra note 14. Another recent article which advances the dis-
cussion of the relationship between racism and legitimation, is Crenshaw, supra note
130.
147 Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 108. Freeman hedges here by confin-
ing his observation to racism "of the kind traditionally experienced by black Ameri-
cans .. " This passage does not address what other kind might exist, and whether it
might be "economically functional." The relationship between the class legitimation
model discussed below, and an updated version of the class domination model, there-
fore, remains to be explored.
148 Id. at 111.
149 See supra notes 132-44 and accompanying text. To this extent Professor Law-
rence is simply wrong when he says that "implicit in most of the leftist scholarship" is
the idea that "ideology [is] a consciously wielded weapon, an intellectual tool that a
group uses to enhance its ... power .. " Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 36,
at 326 n.35. This, however, is not the place for an extended discussion of such a compli-
cated topic, nor does one misstatement by Lawrence detract from his extremely interest-
ing discussion of ideology. See, e.g., id. at 326 (noting that ideology functions as "a
defense mechanism against the anxiety felt by those who hold power through means and
with motives that they cannot comfortably acknowledge.") It is plainly inaccurate, how-
ever, to say that Freeman, or "leftist scholarship" ia general, views ideology as a "con-
sciously wielded hegemonic tool. ... Id. at 387 (emphasis added). In fact, it is my
impression that most CLS scholars have taken great pains to say otherwise, and gener-
ally fall all over themselves to reject vulgar Marxism. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, New Devel-
opments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 281, 285 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ("[A]nyone
who thought about it would begin to see a great many problems with crude instrumen-
talist theory."); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
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Law plays an important role. Law functions not as a weapon
wielded so that, say, bosses win and workers lose in every legal con-
flict, but more subtly and powerfully by convincing us that the status
quo is natural andjust. Law plays a "fundamental social role.., as
legitimation of existing social and power relations." 150 According
to Freeman, the redress of centuries of discrimination was simply
too unsettling for the system to accommodate. 15' Undoing black
subordination turned out to require massive social dislocation and
redistribution. But our legal ideas and institutions are strongly,
centrally anti-redistributionist. Concepts like the legitimacy of ex-
isting rights, the myth of equal opportunity and the sacredness of
formal equality are lynch-pins in rationalizing class domination, and
in justifying substantive inequalities in our class system.
For Freeman, this account explains the uneven shape of
Supreme Court civil rights doctrine. 152 Having committed itself to
ending race discrimination, the Court soon found itself under tre-
mendous pressure (both external and internal) to achieve results. In
ordering remedies, 53 and sometimes even in finding violations, 54
the Court was pushed to try to end conditions of injustice, not simply
instances of discrimination. In attempting to do so, the Court
stretched traditional jurisprudence quite far. Eventually, however,
this impulse was contained and anti-discrimination law was re-
stricted within "safer" bounds not so potentially destabilizing to the
system.
The long history of civil rights law's push against many of our
legal system's strongest central doctrines makes a fascinating story.
The public/private distinction, 155 the substance/procedure distinc-
REV. 209 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gransci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA FORUM
32 (1982) [hereinafter Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci].
150 Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 107.
151 Id. at 97.
152 See id. at 102-05.
153 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
154 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
155 Despite The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 2 (1883), which held that the four-
teenth amendment's guarantees of full citizenship to blacks cannot reach private action,
and which stands as a Constitutional symbol of the fourteenth amendment's "long
sleep" in relation to the people it was drafted to protect, civil rights cases and statutes
eventually made significant inroads on formal boundaries of "public" and "private"
spheres. See, e.g.,Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (public laws forbid-
ding race discrimination can constitutionally extend to private parties); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(court enforcement of the will of private discriminators is itself the exercise of public
power). But see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988) and 109 S. Ct.
2363 (1989). Of course it is important to recall cases where the force of the pub-
lic/private distinction has cut the other way, and where anti-racists have found them-
selves defending "private" realms from the exercise of "public" power. See, e.g., Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (public laws imposing racist restrictions cannot constitu-
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tion,156 and the notion of the protected legitimacy of vested
rights, 157 have all been pushed far and hard by cyclical pressures for
real relief from the effects of white supremacy. Freeman contends
that the system cannot afford to strain these notions as far as would
be necessary to "undo" racism, at least absent a booming, ex-
panding economy.
Achievement of substantial equality of conditions for blacks,
given their history and present situation, could only be achieved by
overcoming traditional public/private and substance/process con-
straints, by challenging present notions of vested rights, and by re-
jecting the myth of equal opportunity.'5 8 This the system cannot
afford to do, says Freeman, because such a major disruption would
irreparably damage its underlying architecture. All groups and peo-
ple disadvantaged under the present system might begin to lay claim
to the principle that equal conditions, rather than mere equal op-
portunities, should be their right, that radical redistributions of re-
sources and power are not only possible, but are permissible under
our law. After all, poor and working class whites have been enjoying
the dubious benefits of "equal opportunity" for generations, and
they, too, have reason to question the justice of its starting points
and its end results in real social practice.
According to the class legitimation model, the threat of such
ideological destabilization is what halted the civil rights movement's
legal momentum. Although the system may not "need" white
supremacy for "purely" economic reasons, neither can it afford to
undo the white supremacist legacy. As a result, "the history of an-
tionally extend to private individuals who desire to marry); Berea College v. Kentucky,
211 U.S. 45 (1908) (public laws imposing racist rules can constitutionally extend to a
private corporation).
156 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (even
though the defendant school board no longer "discriminates" on the basis of race, but
uses a formally neutral rule, the conditions of white supremacy continue, so something
must be done); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (even though the de-
fendant employer administers a "neutral" test and decides to hire applicants only on the
basis of "neutral" test scores, the conditions of white supremacy have unfairly burdened
the black test-takers before they even arrive, and the assumptions about what "qualifica-
tions" are measured are too untested, vague and unrelated to job performance to stand
in the face of proof that blacks are disproportionately affected).
157 See, e.g., The Emancipation Proclamation, No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863) (privately-
owned human property, granted special constitutional recognition and protection since
the original drafting, is an intrusive exercise of public power); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 3 (furthermore, not a penny of compensation is paid for all this confis-
cated/appropriated/liberated property).
158 Specifically, Freeman argues that the system cannot afford to destabilize the legal
doctrines of (1) formal (as opposed to substantive) equality; (2) legitimacy of vested
rights; and (3) equal opportunity. Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 111-12.
Karl Klare discusses the public/private distinction and the substance/process distinction
in relation to civil rights law and the constraints they impose on race remediation.
Klare, supra note 60, at 173-85.
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tidiscrimination law suggests that no genuine liberation or change
in the conditions associated with the historical practice of racial dis-
crimination can be accomplished without confronting class structure
"159
Implications of either class model extend, not only to court-
rooms or law journals, but also to the streets. Building multiracial
class unity would be crucial. On the shop floor, in rural communi-
ties, in urban neighborhoods, or in whole cities or regions, this view
has traditionally meant working to forge alliances across race lines
in furtherance of common class goals.
Litigation and legal scholarship also would have a role to play.
The struggles of the fifties and sixties to abolish dejure racial classifi-
cations were consistent with a class domination model. In that vi-
sion, such classifications contribute to the artificial division of black
and white workers. Therefore, destroying such classifications
should undermine arrangements and relations that promote racist
ideas and should help create unity. Popular movements need legal
representation to advance their concrete programs and to defend
such programs from attacks by opponents and by the state. The
legal fight n;net rarial QPg-gation appears more problematic from
the viewpoint of a class legitimation model, but nevertheless is
supported.
In a post dejure world, however, the implications of either ver-
sion of the class model are not so clear. One possibility is that the
time for attention to law as an instrument of serious change is over.
A campaign newspaper distributed by organizers for Jesse Jackson
in the South reads:
Twenty years ago racial violence in the Old South was not
only constant, but legal. Today racial violence still occurs but it's
illegal, so we can struggle effectively to end it.
But economic violence is legal and is devastating the lives of
Americans of all races. On March 8, we can begin to move for-
ward from racial battlegrounds to economic commonground to
achieve economic justice in a New South.1 60
However, a turn from law to economics or politics may not be
entirely within the power of those seeking to overturn white su-
premacist practices and institutions. After all, civil rights scholars
did not ask for most of the affirmative action cases, but were forced
159 Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 97.
160 This excerpt suggests a turn not only from law, but from race as well. It is ques-
tionable whether that message should be taken at face value, however. Reverend Jack-
son carries a racial battleground everywhere like a force field in this culture, whether he
chooses to or not. It seems fair to surmise that he sees little reason to fear that the racial
significance of his campaign will be lost on anyone.
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to defend affirmative action against attack when the struggle over
race was brought before the courts by the opponents of change.
The class legitimation model suggests that we attend to law for
our own reasons as well. Under the class legitimation model, the
ideological needs of the system have determined the forward bounda-
ries of racial progress. It follows that the analysis and critique of
ideology itself needs to become a focus of anti-racist work. 16 1
Freeman says, "the belief structures we accept without thinking
are the real impediment to any genuine steps in the process. . . ,"162
Although nothing inherent in the model I have drawn limits schol-
ars to any one methodology, 163 scholarship explicitly in this vein 164
has thus far tended to present itself as an act of sophisticated legal
consciousness-raising rather than as a message to the bench, a prac-
tical aid to argument-seeking civil rights litigators, or a plan of ac-
tion for lawyer-organizers. It has concerned itself with finding links
between race and class, and with discerning large trends and pat-
terns in the way civil rights law has functioned to legitimate class
and racial hierarchies. 165 At any rate, the stress in such work is usu-
ally to look beyond and through race to class.
A model of white supremacy which portrays that system as in-
terlocked with class dominance or with the legitimation of class hier-
archies, and which insists on the (contingent or inevitable)
interconnectedness of race and class, has powerful explanatory
force but serious potential weaknesses as well. Those weaknesses
will be discussed below. The next section, however, will focus on a
161 The focus on ideology suggests a central and strategic role for the intellectual
and is in this way nicely self-validating for academic lawyers. The class legitimation
model directly implicates the world of legal scholarship. However, its significance for
the world of social action is much less clear. The implications of the class domination
model, on the other hand, point unavoidably toward the world of political action and
mass organizing, while its implications for legal work are less certain.
162 Bell, Hurdle, supra note 16, at 16 (Alan Freeman speaking). But note that both
Klare and Freeman do discuss the "real world." Freeman notes that "[t]here has to be a
coalition of lower-class whites and blacks to solve the economic problem." Id. And Karl
Klare says, "[liabor and civil rights activists could enrich one another's efforts and learn
from each other's failures.... Neither movement has a chance to break out of its cur-
rent malaise without championing the goals of the other." Klare, supra note 60, at 158.
163 See the discussion on methodology, infra notes 242-86 and accompanying text.
164 See, e.g., Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14; Freeman, supra note 23; Klare,
supra note 60.
165 The work that I have identified as consistent with this version of the class model
of white supremacy reflects its assumptions in two ways. First, its focus is on law as
ideology; second, it chooses to examine in a substantive way the relationship of race to
class. Alan Freeman, for instance, attempts to show why the logic of race remediation
collided with entrenched legal ideas related to the legitimation of class hierarchy. See
Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 110-14. Karl Klare asserts a series of parallels
between labor law and civil rights law, and suggests that understanding the intercon-




second possible model of white supremacy, a model that offers a
different explanation for that system's amazing powers of resistance.
B. White Supremacy for Its Own Sake
The second model I want to pose, what I call the "race model,"
characterizes white supremacy as an evil standing on its own base.
In this view there is no reason to look beyond the system of racial
hierarchy itself to understand its well-springs and strength. White
supremacy produces material and psychological benefits for whites,
while extracting a heavy material' 66 and psychological price from
blacks. White supremacy is concretely in the interests of all white
people. It assures them greater resources, a wider range of personal
choice, more power, and more self-esteem than they would have if
they were (1) forced to share the above with people of color, and (2)
deprived of the subjective sensation of superiority they enjoy as a
result of the societal presence of subordinate non-white others. 16 7
According to the race model, this is the reason white people
resist an end to white supremacy. They have a real stake in the sys-
tem and, with the exception of a few idiosyncratic and often not very
reliable defectors, they will fight to defend it. The explanation,
then, for the halt of the civil rights movement is simply the en-
trenched power of resistant whites who refuse to give up further
privileges.
Even in the pure and unreal form in which I am casting this
model, divisions and inequalities among whites would be recog-
nized. However, those divisions would be seen as relatively shifting
and episodic. Faced with a serious challenge from people of color,
whites would join ranks despite internal rifts. Race is key, not
class. 168
166 This reminds us that the race model is by no means "non-economic." Clearly
economic exploitation of blacks is one central pillar of white supremacy under either
model.
167 Peggy McIntosh recently has made two further interesting points. First, whites
in our society enjoy not only the subjective sensation of superiority, but also a kind of
unconscious "non-sensation" of well-being and security, all the more meaningful and
valuable because those who enjoy it are largely unaware that they "have" it while others
do not. Her second point, and perhaps the more contestable in this context, is that
whites are in some ways privileged, but in other ways profoundly damaged and retarded,
by this system of "unearned advantage and conferred dominance." PEGGY MCINTOSH,
WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAL AccouNT OF COMING TO SEE COR-
RESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN WOMEN'S STUDIES 14 (Working Paper No. 189, Wel-
lesley College Center for Research on Women) (emphasis omitted) (on file at Cornell
Law Review).
168 Class and race are the dimensions around which I have built the models, but they
are hardly the only significant divisions in our society. Gender is for me the other great
category, as profound as race and class. But there are other divisions as well: religion,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, disability, nationality, etc. I do not wish to discount
them. To my mind, one of the most difficult and important lessons a person seeking to
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Several elements of our experience suggest the power of the
race model. White supremacist regimes are, in fact, not confined to
any particular political economy. 169 They can be shown to exist in
non-capitalist economies as well as in socialist ones. 170
The long cycles of American race law lend strength to the
supremacy-for-its-own-sake argument. Despite a sequence of dra-
matic changes in underlying social and economic conditions from
colonial times to the present, and despite unparalleled legal upheav-
als, blacks as a race are still subordinate:
American society periodically produces a symbol of redemp-
tion in the wake of unspeakable cruelties to its blacks. At the na-
tional level, the symbol is usually a document with liberating
potential: the Emancipation Proclamation, the post Civil War
Amendments, the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s and, of course,
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Each of these docu-
ments, while issued out of the honest commitment of some and
the selfish self-interest of many, contained language with the po-
tential to expunge our national Bluebeard image, the dark stain of
understand society could learn is to keep at least "The Three," and often more, of these
divisions in mind simultaneously.
Nor can I adequately defend my reasons for claiming special status for "The
Three." These particular divisions are closely linked to suffering and injustice, of
course, but mere quantitative suffering is not a satisfactory criterion. Otherwise we
could focus on a hospital burn unit or death row. I believe my choice instead involves a
sense that these divisions and their resolutions hold power for change. I continue to
sense this, and to push for larger meaning despite my suspicion of the claims of grand
theories that purport to solve all problems at once.
From a more practical perspective, we can certainly say with confidence that issues
of gender and race must be on the agenda of the labor movement, that issues of race and
class must be on the agenda of the women's movement, and that issues of class and
gender must be on the agenda of the civil rights movement. We can further say that this
imperative springs from the need for internal vision, strength and coherence as much as
from any pressure for tactical external alliances or public relations.
Finally, if all of that is so, then gender must be on the agenda of civil rights scholar-
ship. Yet here I am constructing a bipolar system of race and class. I have no defense,
only an acknowledgment that much work remains. We especially need the wisdom of
our sisters of color in legal scholarship. (We must therefore discover the ways they need
and want our help in making law schools a better place for them to hone and speak that
wisdom. See Austin, Sapphire Bound!, supra note 40; Austin, Resistance Tactics, supra note
40; Moran, supra note 40).
169 "[R]acism in America is an enormously powerful ideological institution, consid-
erably older than the political institutions of our republic." Kennedy, supra note 23, at
1342.
170 Clearly this observation lends support to the idea that race can transcend class
and can outlast class hierarchies. On the other hand, Derrick Bell has observed that to
the extent we recognize the existence of ruling elites or privileged sectors in socialist
countries, the persistence of white supremacy in those countries may be interpreted as
supporting the class model as well. He suspects that racism plays a stabilizing role in all
kinds of regimes to preserve existing class hierarchies and to mute "social upset." Per-
sonal interview with Professor Bell, November 1987. (This Article does not attempt to
discuss the serious and closely-related problems of anti-semitism, but the continuing
virulence of those problems in Eastern European socialist regimes bears mention here.)
1036 [Vol. 74:993
CIVIL RIGHTS SCHOLARSHIP
slavery and racism. Without looking closely at the motives behind
the drafting of these documents, black Americans have accepted
the language for its redemptive promise and have urged its fulfill-
ment .... [But after] a brief period of hope, blacks once again
find themselves trapped in the darkness of a new and more subtle
set of subordinating social shadows. 171
Another piece of social experience that suggests we ought to
take the race model seriously is the tendency of whites to choose
race over class in their social and political allegiances. With dis-
turbing consistency, whites, who would appear from the standpoint
of either class model to have an identity of interest with oppressed
blacks, fail to act on that purported interest, and instead identify and
side with fellow whites. Time and again fragile alliances between
blacks and whites fall apart when the time comes to take a stand
about racism. Too often blacks experience white allies as more op-
portunistic than reliable.
The racism-as-tool model explains this phenomenon as the suc-
cess of a ploy: the racist system has successfully instilled false con-
sciousness in the white worker, who ends up worse off due to his
own ignorance and error. Race model proponents, to the contrary,
would acknowledge that the bigoted white worker may in some
sense be misled in his convictions, but would also point to the gains
all whites enjoy at the expense of blacks under a regime of racial
dominance.
What are the implications of the race model of white
supremacy? For one, a race model thinker would want to preserve a
conscious focus on race and white supremacy as the subjects to be
addressed.
A focus on race in the world of political action might lead to
wariness of the very coalitions that the class model would celebrate.
It suggests resistance to doctrines or attitudes that distort or distract
from efforts to end white supremacy. JesseJackson's talk of moving
on from racial battleground to economic commonground might be
worrisome. On what basis will we be "moving on" and toward what
end? 172 John Calmore, for instance, advocates that blacks should
even resist too easy an alliance with other people of color, that they
"get off the minority bandwagon."' 173 Although he acknowledges
that competition for scarce resources "unduly sets various groups
against each other," he asserts that "the plight of poor blacks is
worsened as the civil rights movement has now been expanded to
171 Bell, Faiiy Tale, supra note 27, at 334-35 (footnotes omitted).
172 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
173 Calmore, supra note 15, at 217.
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include others who threaten to siphon benefits . "... ,,74 If alliances
built around common interests offer no long-term hope, then all al-
liances are suspect, but almost an) alliance (including one with ruling
white elites) could be justified on temporary and tactical grounds.
Beyond wariness of actual political coalitions, the race model
further entails wariness of "coalitional doctrine." In this view,
blacks have much to be proud of in their role as drum-majors for
constitutional and social justice in America, but much to regret as
well. It is ironic that black legal battles have so often been in the
forefront of successful efforts to expand the creation, recognition
and enforcement of individual rights, yet the majority of black peo-
ple have so little to show for these gains.' 75
One response to this pattern is to develop a doctrine that con-
sciously takes white supremacy into account and resists "deracializa-
tion" of the legal protections and entitlements sought. Thus, black
scholar Charles Lawrence notes specifically that he is "attempting to
limit the merging of economic and racial discrimination .... 176
A race model analysis might lead one to look for "black law;" 1 77
174 Id. (emphasis added). But note that Calmore later specifically approves of coali-
tion-building. He argues that it will be safer if pursued on the basis of a well-defined,
"indigestible," and self-consciously black presence. Id. at 219-20.
175 As Professor Bell has put it:
[W]hile the Constitution, by its terms, specifically excluded blacks
from its historic recognition and protection of individual rights, the ma-
jor implementation of individual rights for all Americans has come
through the efforts by blacks and their supporters to use the law to elimi-
nate first slavery and then racial discrimination.
Derrick Bell, Victims As Heroes: A Minority Perspective on Constitutional Law 14 (May
21, 1987) (unpublished text of remarks delivered at Smithsonian Institution's Interna-
tional Symposium, "Constitutional Roots, Rights, and Responsibilities") (on file at Cor-
nell Law Review). See also David Hall's eloquent article, The Constitution and Race: A
Critical Perspective, 5 N.Y.L. ScH.J. HUM. RTs. 229 (1988) and Vincent Harding, Wrestling
toward the Dawn: The Afro-American Freedom Movement and the Changing Constitution, 74 J.
AM. HIST. 718 (1987).
176 Lawrence, supra note 36, at 365 n.227. Lawrence suggests a new set of opera-
tions for equal protection doctrine, to allow and even force that doctrine to take account
of unconscious white racism. From a tactical point of view, Lawrence may need to char-
acterize his proposal as a narrow one. To that extent, the cited statement may simply
represent skilled persuasion. However, my sense is that the argument also rests on a
judgment that it is in the interest of blacks to aim for a certain separatism in civil rights
doctrine. This is so even though it may mean Lawrence must ignore some issues of
wealth and poverty that deeply affect blacks. For instance, he is careful to point out that
his proposed test (for unconscious intent) would leave "untouched non-race-dependent
decisions that disproportionately burden blacks only because they are overrepresented
or underrepresented among the decision's targets or beneficiaries." Id. at 324.
177 This formulation uncovers an ambiguity that is endemic in this Article, and
which exemplifies the difficulties of trying to maintain multiple visions. This Article sel-
dom discusses differences between blacks and "other minorities." The race model itself
contains this ambiguity. There are real ways in which the experiences of BLACK Ameri-
cans are sui generis. And some civil rights scholars want to recognize and preserve and
move on that difference. There are also many ways that white supremacy is just that: a
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to stress, for example, the special claim blacks have upon the post-
Civil War amendments and civil rights statutes.'7 8 Such a claim is
true to the history of these enactments and justified by the special
harms suffered by blacks in America. 179 Alternatively, the race
model might lead one to propose new and expanded legal protec-
tions for specifically racial wrongs. 8 0
The race model also suggests that we need to devote serious
attention to understanding the sources and construction of individ-
ual ideas about race-the "psychology" of racism. 18t The race
model suggests that racist beliefs are deeper than mistakes of fact,
and that it is necessary to understand race at the level of individual
personality. This is so not only because racism at an individual level
can be seen as "pathological," but also because the power and
strength of white supremacy seem to come largely from its deep
roots in individual consciousness and self-concept. 182 The race
racism of whites over all others. For this reason blacks and other minorities will often
make common cause, common doctrine, etc. I have decided for purposes of this discus-
sion to live with the ambiguity and let it remain vague.
178 The thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, of course, abol-
ished slavery. The fourteenth amendment guaranteed the rights of national citizenship
to all citizens and forbade the states to interfere with those rights (at least on its face,
though the path of the amendment's judicial interpretation has been checkered, to say
the least). The fifteenth amendment extended the franchise to male blacks. For an im-
portant article treating the special status of blacks in the Constitution as central, see
Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387 (1967).
See also Robert Sedler, The Constitution and the Consequences of the Social History of Racism, 40
ARK. L. REV. 677 (1987) (discussing "the black freedom value").
179 A slightly diluted version of this approach suggests, if not an explicitly pro-black
doctrine, then at least a pro-minority doctrine. See Smith, supra note 17, at 334-41 (sug-
gesting a "minority advantaging principle," and analogizing to contra proferendem rules in
contract and the liberal construction doctrine as it applies to Native Americans).
180 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epi-
thets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) and Mari Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
181 See Lawrence, supra note 36. Of course, psychologists and social scientists have
been concerned with this dimension for some time, and the literature is voluminous.
Lawrence is not the only legal scholar to have specifically pointed out the importance of
this dimension to legal thought about race. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 84-85, 89-93, 270-74 (1st ed. 1972) (assorted materials on the psychol-
ogy of racism). The relative lack of attention to psychology by civil rights scholars "lean-
ing toward class" has been the subject of criticism by some "leaning toward race."
Richard Delgado notes, "I was unable to locate any CLS articles or books on the psychol-
ogy of racism." Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have
What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 315 n.86 (1987) (emphasis ad-
ded). He also deplores the "ironic failure" of CLS scholars "to articulate a satisfactory
theory of... the genesis ... of racism." Id. at 322.
182 In this regard, the challenges facing feminist and anti-racist scholars show strong
kinship. Much recent feminist work, both legal and non-legal, has concerned itself with
the societal and inter-personal processes involved in the "construction of gender." See,
e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978). Ann Scales makes a comment that is relevant for its un-
fortunate lapse in awareness of race, but also for its provocative suggestion about psy-
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model and the class legitimation model may be approaching each
other on this ground, at least insofar as the legitimation model con-
cerns itself with problems of consciousness and consent.
C. Criticism
Of course, no model alone yields an adequate understanding of
white supremacy. Even the simplest formulation of each implies a
powerful critique of the other. In this section I will touch on the
major problems with each model and suggest directions that I think
might be fruitful.
The class domination model has a tendency either toward crude
instrumentalism with an associated unhelpful characterization of
white supremacy as a conscious plot of a ruling class, or toward
blind determinism, with its equally unhelpful characterization of
white supremacy as a necessary consequence of a particular set of
economic relations. The class legitimation model, on the other
hand, tends to ignore or dismiss the influence of economic develop-
ments on legal and popular ideologies. 8 3 Both versions of the class
model fail to offer an adequate theory of racism itself.'8 4 If white
chology, law and domination of one group by another: "Feminist jurisprudence is
unique [sic] in its demand for an adequate psychology.... In making the connection
between domination and mechanisms of sex-role differentiation, feminism also goes be-
yond Marxism. The latter sees domination as imposed by external economic and polit-
ical factors; feminism attends fully to the powerful oppressive forces within us." Ann
Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE LJ. 1373, 1389-90
(1986).
It is to be hoped that efforts focused on the construction and operation of gender
and race can aid and inspire each other. There are intersections as well as parallels. See,
e.g., ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT (1988) (the importance of recognizing issues of race and class when dealing
with issues of gender). See also Derrick Bell, The Race-Charged Relationship of Black Men and
Black Women, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 3 (discussing the tortured effects of
racism on gender identity and the relations between black women and men).
One, but by no means the only, sex-race link is the fact that racist psychology is
often sexualized and eroticized. This is an old and powerful insight, with a sizeable (and
predominantly male-centered) literature. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 271, 285-93 (1st ed. 1972); ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968);
JORDAN, supra note 131; LILLIAN SMITH, KILLERS OF THE DREAM (1949). See also Judy
Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989) (arguing that black women form their own group for
many purposes; not black-plus-woman, but somehow blackwoman; not blue-plus-yellow,
but somehow green).
183 A real comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the class domination and
class legitimation models as they relate to, illuminate, and implicitly criticize each other
is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the focus here is primarily on the relation of
both class models to the race model. Questions dealing with the two class models interse
are addressed only sketchily. They certainly merit further development.
184 There is a sense in which the problem of the class model of white supremacy in
America is related to the problem that leftist political analysis faces around the world.
The exhilarating simplicity of the original Marxist vision, with its perfect fusion of moral
outrage, strategic acumen, and certain victory,'has run upon unexpected turns. The
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supremacy is supposedly a dependent variable, why is it acting so
independent?185
White supremacy is treated by the class models as a derivative
or secondary phenomenon. It does not receive the independent
and focused attention necessary for us to understand and change it.
Richard Delgado maintains that CLS (in this instance a stand-in for
my "class model") "simply assumes that racism is just another form
of class-based oppression, a product of a hierarchical social struc-
ture."'1 6 In a similar vein, Andrew Haines has accused both Alan
Freeman and Karl Klare of "economic reductionism" in their ap-
proach to race questions. 187
Delgado's and Haines's accusations are overdrawn. CLS schol-
ars have attempted to eschew reductionism. Alan Freeman has as-
serted: "There is no doubt that racial discrimination in American
life and history has been a distinct form of oppression, something
different from other relations of exploitation,"'' 18 and has rejected
"theories that merely collapse race into class."' 1 9
In a sense, Freeman himself is rejecting the class model, or at
least taking the position that the class model alone provides an in-
sufficient explanation of white supremacy. Nevertheless, it is fair to
say that proponents of a class model-whether the domination or
the legitimation version-have failed to take up the challenge of this
insight.' 90 When critics of the class model challenge it as "eco-
powerful role played by multi-class movements for national liberation, the failure of the
working classes of the advanced industrial countries to rise up and take control of na-
tional economies, the dismal record of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., and the power
of race and gender as social forces have all created tremendous strains on the original
theory.
Nowhere does class alone appear to be an adequate explanation for what has and
has not happened in the distribution and redistribution of power and wealth around the
world. The civil rights debate over the relevance of class echoes parts of this global
conversation among leftists of different persuasions. Our "American Dilemma" is now,
more than ever, globally situated, though American critics and activists have thus far
failed to adequately appropriate this reality.
185 Derrick Bell reflects one way of looking at this problem in his anecdote about the
old Harlem resident who responded to a young leftist's harangue in the 1930s with the
query, "when the revolution is over and the communists are in power, will they still be
white?" Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise, supra note 40, at 391. See also Derrick Bell &
Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE LJ. 1609 (1988).
On the problems of anti-communism for the civil rights movement, see discussion
infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. Of course, thejoke's barb could be aimed as
much at opportunism and racism in the practice of white communists of the thirties as it
is at the inherent inadequacies of the class model.
186 Delgado, supra note 181, at 315.
187 Andrew Haines, The CLSM and Racism: UsefulAnalytics and Guidesfor SocialAction or
An Irrelevant Legal Skepticism and Solipsism?, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 685, 723, 726
(1987).
188 Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 97.
189 Id. at 115 n.28.
190 White scholars of race do face difficulties in pushing further. Richard Delgado,
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nomic reductionism," they may be unfairly ignoring important indi-
cations to the contrary, but they may also be reflecting the fact that,
thus far, even the sophisticated versions have done little to flesh out
a theory of racism. 19 1 The legitimation model offers a helpful expla-
nation of why race remediation at this point would destabilize our
class-justifying legal regime, but it fails to address the ways in which
racism has such a unique, positive value for stabilizing class
inequities.
While the class models do not offer an adequate theory of race,
the race model provides too few tools for understanding pressing
issues of class. 192 It fails to contend with class divisions and con-
for instance, launched a widely-noted criticism directed at white civil rights academicians
for their high-handed domination of the field of civil rights legal analysis and their fail-
ure to take the work of minority scholars seriously. He suggested they give up this dom-
ination by leaving the field, a move which he suggested would open the way for scholars
of color to shape the discourse. Richard Delgado, The Inperial Scholar: Reflections on a
Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 577 (1984). Randall Kennedy,
another scholar of color, has recently criticized Delgado's approach, and the trend he
believes it represents, in a controversial article, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989). Delgado will respond in a forthcoming issue of the Virginia
Law Review.
In my view, white civil rights scholars should (1) listen carefully to Delgado's telling
words and to the energy and anger behind them, (2) work well past the boundaries of
their personal comfort zone in efforts to converse inclusively, interactively and atten-
tively with scholars of color, and (3) keep thinking and writing about race. I believe
white scholars have a special responsibility to deal with white supremacy and the social
and legal construction of racial visions and identities, particularly white visions and
identities.
191 Freeman's review of the second edition of Professor Bell's law textbook attempts
to go further. First he reiterates his declaration that "collapsing" race into class would
be an error. However, he says, it would be equally foolish to "[treat] racism as a mode
of oppression so autonomous from capitalist social and economic relationships that it
can be rectified by aiming at a target of oppressors that appears as (classless?) 'white
society.' " Freeman, Race and Class, supra note 146, at 1891.
Admitting that what he proposes will be difficult, Freeman points to GEORGE FRED-
RICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY (198 1), a comparative history of race relations in the United
States and South Africa, as a model for a properly sensitive treatment of the race-class
puzzle. These latter statements show a commendable effort by Freeman to put more
substance into his "distinct but not autonomous" formulation, but they constitute only a
bare beginning.
Eugene Genovese's ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL (1972) is another example of what some
CLS writers see as a work that properly recognizes the force of both race and class. This
important study of African American slavery explores the themes of race and class in a
conscious and sophisticated way. It leaves us, however, with intimations of what is to
come rather than with a realized theory. In the Preface, Genovese cryptically refers to
the question of a distinct African American nation and to "[his own] reading of the
evidence as constituting a national thrust." He soon retreats, however, "... knowing
that the ambiguity of the black experience as a national question lends the evidence to
different readings, I have chosen to stay close to my primary responsibility: to tell the
story of slave life as carefully and accurately as possible." Id. at xvi. The limits of a
"pure class" model have not yet been overcome, though they may have been
recognized.
192 One example of the pressing nature of the class issue is the controversy over
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flicts among whites and it helps us little in coming to grips with the
increasing black stratification that has been an ironic result of the
civil rights movement and societal reactions to it.193
Both the race and class models suffer from problems in their
visions of the future. The class models have their roots in a leftist
tradition that once saw the unfolding of a new egalitarian and par-
ticipatory communism from the deep logic of capitalism itself. Since
racism was seen as derivative, it was thought that it (along with racial
and cultural differences?) would fall away once class solidarity was
achieved and class contradictions overcome. This initial optimism
has suffered hard historical knocks. The Eurocentric whiteness (and
maleness) and the arm-and-hammer imagery of its notion of the
"working class" have proved all too inaccurate and impoverished.
To have persuasive power as a vision, the class model must come to
grips with race not only in present analysis, but also in future vision.
That vision must include meaningful autonomy for blacks and other
minorities. It should show that it accounts for the social value of
minority cultures built under fire, and understands the necessity for
long-term vigilance and opposition toward white supremacist beliefs
and behavior patterns.
The race model also has problems with its vision of the future.
Within our current national boundaries, blacks are a relatively small
WILLIAM WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMER-
ICAN INSTrrTIONS (1978). Wilson posited that the changing economic structure and the
outlawing of overt discrimination led to a situation where blacks' opportunities are now
founded far more from their economic class position than from their status as black
Americans. See generally id. This position generated heated debate about race and class.
Many civil rights scholars and activists greeted Wilson's apparent discounting of race
with distress and apprehension that serious attention might shift completely away from
the uniqueness of black oppression. For a critique of Wilson's thesis and some report-
age on other scholarly reactions to it, see Calmore, supra note 15, at 210-15.
193 Professor Bell has noted "the steady slide of a full third of blacks beyond poverty
and into an underclass status where the hopelessness is vast and devastating, even as Dr.
W.E.B. DuBois's 'The Talented Tenth' rise ever higher in the ranks of their chosen
endeavors." Bell, Fairy Tale, supra note 27, at 333. It is important, of course, not to
exaggerate the significance of such stratification. Many of the gains of the Talented (and
Lucky) Tenth are still tenuous. Frequently those gains are more cosmetic than real.
The stresses of race still impose themselves even on those able to benefit from the new
opportunities. (See Welsh, The Black Talent Trap, Washington Post, May 1, 1988, at Cl.)
Adolph Reed, on the other hand, appears to perceive more fundamental differences of
interest between an elite stratum of blacks and the majority. Reed, RACE POLITICS AND
CULTURE, supra note 5.
Meanwhile, Scripps Howard reported in fall 1988 that a new study revealed that the
gap between rich and poor blacks was widening faster than the gap between rich and
poor Americans as a whole. Rich-poor black gap growing rapidly, Knoxville News-Sentinel,
Oct. 18, 1988, at A7. An article published after this one was first written does try to
focus directly on class divisions within the black community and affects those different
strata. Roy Brooks, Racial Subordination through Formal Equal Opportunity, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 879 (1988).
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minority. 194 Black resort to unilateral armed rebellion looks suicidal
in this setting.19 5
So where does change come from, according to the race model?
Some appear to have given up hope:
[T]he socio-economic deterioration of blacks will continue and
will do so to the point of extermination. Any effort to reverse this
inevitable outcome will have to take the form of violent confronta-
tion; to respond violently in a nation so dedicated to white
supremacy over a black minority is an open invitation to
extermination.
[S]tatistics make it clear that the economic road to black redemp-
tion may be a dead end .... [T]he political road to black survival
does not offer more promise .... [T]here is little reason to place
much faith in the law.
Perhaps, under these circumstances, the solemn admonition from
Dylan Thomas might do well: Do not go gentle into that good
night. 196
If blacks are an isolated and stigmatized minority and cannot ulti-
mately trust coalitions, then even gains achieved through massive
pressure and mobilization will remain perpetually vulnerable. 197
194 This is not to deny what lies beyond our boundaries. As Nina Simone sang more
than 20 years ago:
Mr. Backlash, Mr. Backlash,
Just who do you think I am?
The world is full of folks like me
Who are black, yellow, beige and brown.
Langston Hughes & Nina Simone, Backlash Blues (on Nina Simone Sings the Blues, RCA
1967) (emphasis added). The domestic significance for blacks in this country of global
sisters and brothers of color has yet to reach its climax. Professor Bell remarks,
"[pjerhaps the emerging Third World will finally become a factor." Bell, Hurdle, supra
note 16, at 29 (Derrick Bell speaking). See also Dudziak, supra note 136. At any rate,
blacks domestically are a minority, and one that is shrinking in relation to other minori-
ties. Demographic predictors are firm that by the end of the century blacks will no
longer be the largest of our minority groups, but will have been surpassed by Hispanics.
195 As James Weldon Johnson put it eloquently over 50 years ago: "We would be
justified in taking up arms or anything we could lay hands on and fighting for the com-
mon rights we are entitled to and denied, if we had a chance to win. But I know and we
all know there is not a chance." JAMES JOHNSON, NEGRO AMERICANS, WHAT Now?
(1934), quoted in D. BELL, supra note 3, at 70.
196 Bell, Hurdle, supra note 16, at 25, 28 (Sidney WiIlhelm Speaking).
197 Linda Greene, for instance, cogently sketches the "blurred" and uncertain na-
ture of Reconstruction reforms and 1960s civil rights gains even at the moments of their
inception. Linda Greene, Twenty Years of Civil Rights: How Firm a Foundation?, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1985). Professor Greene reflects on the fact that when the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, its constitutionality was in serious doubt because it
purported to reach private action and was therefore in direct tension with The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and years of settled fourteenth amendment jurispru-
dence. Under the circumstances, she accepts as tactically prudent the decision of con-
gressional drafters to rely on the Commerce Clause as authorization for the legislation.
(This strategy was ultimately successful in preserving the Act from constitutional attack.
See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 715 (1961)). However, Greene
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Economics Professor William Darity noted at a 1984 Rutgers Law
School conference: "[L]egal evasions of a legal apparatus that is not
widely endorsed will accumulate over time .... [J]udicial remedies
become an illusory solution for excluded groups that lack the power
to impose a change."' 98
A deep pessimism thus haunts the race model. (To say this is
not, in itself, a meaningful "critique" of the model, of course. If it is
true that white supremacy binds all whites together so that their soli-
darity will ultimately reassert itself in perpetuity to conquer differ-
ences among them and confirm black subordination, then American
black people and their anomalous friends should be pessimistic.) I
will argue, however, that the pessimism implied by a pure race
model is unwarranted.
An article by Richard Delgado reveals themes relevant to this
discussion.19 9 He distinguishes two theories of how best to end ra-
cist behavior by whites. One is the "social contact" theory, which
holds out the hope that white people can actually change deeply-
held and mistaken beliefs about race through exposure to, and in-
teraction with, people of color. Delgado implicitly rejects this the-
ory, favoring instead the "'confrontation' approach-where
prejudice is publicly confronted and discouraged through formal
structures." 20 0
Delgado's choice rests in large part on his experience that "for-
mal public settings are relatively safe for minorities, while informal
private settings present risks. To minimize racism, one should
structure settings so that public norms are enforced, and prejudice
openly confronted and discouraged. Society should avoid creating
intimate, unguided settings where highly charged interracial en-
counters can take place." 20 1
points out that it was only because of the great weakness and vulnerability of the four-
teenth amendment from its infancy that such a tactical approach even had to be consid-
ered. Greene, supra at 710. The Court's ominous decision to re-examine Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), is further proof of the fragility of many civil rights prece-
dents. Massive political response and concern for stare decisis have left Runyon intact
for now. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). But the unraveling
of previously established doctrine continues apace, with politics playing a particularly
open role in determining its extent and effect.
198 William Darity, Comments, 37 RtrrGERS L. REv. 977, 980 (1985). At times the
picture looks even bleaker. Not only are black gains constantly vulnerable to erosion,
but even the temporary victories often strengthen the hand of those in control. At a
moment of apparent victory for the civil rights struggle, when LyndonJohnson ringingly
announced "We Shall Overcome" in a dramatic televised statement to the nation (see
Eyes on the Prize, supra note 18, Episode 6), many civil rights activists found themselves
paradoxically seized with dread and loathing.
199 See Delgado, supra note 181.
200 Id. at 317-18.
201 Id. at 318. One might think of this as a behavior modification approach as op-
posed to encounter group. I now teach a course on Discrimination and the Law and
1989] 1045
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
These observations by a committed and perceptive person of
color should be important and troubling for whites. The aim of this
strategy is not white conversion or education (an apparently hope-
less task), but black protection. It rejects strategies that involve risk
for blacks in the hope that whites can be redeemed. 20 2 This position
appears to be founded in an attitude of hard-nosed realism about
what minorities can expect. It presumes that prospects for deeper
transformation (personal or societal) are dim. It does preserve an
important role for scholars and activists. There is room in this vi-
sion for smart people to contain damage and build defenses. It may
even be possible to work the system against itself in order to pry
open a little sheltered breathing room for the oppressed.20 3
White civil rights scholars need to appropriate this message, to
understand and examine what Delgado means when he says, "We
know by a kind of instinct that there are times when our white
friends can be trusted and times when they cannot... that there are
occasions .. .when we are comparatively safe, and that there are
other occasions when we must be careful." 20 4 But I continue to be-
lieve a real possibility of deeper change exists. We need not, and
should not, settle for damage control alone, or concentrate only on
assuring effective defenses for people we assume to be inevitably
isolated and powerless. 20 5
A pure race model, given United States demographics and the
present national economy, sees solid change coming only from with-
out. Its notion of the best blacks could aim for is to use their limited
leverage and to maximize building formal constraints against racial
harms. While it is important to appropriate the real and immediate
have thought of Delgado's thesis when I observe that concerned white students who are
worried about racism frequently announce their belief that increased social contact and
personal interaction are the most important single ingredients in the fight to end racial
injustice. Concerned black students worried about racism almost never voice such a
belief.
202 To use Duncan Kennedy's term, this is the voice of one who has experienced too
much "bad fusion" on too many occasions to want to keep at it any longer. See Kennedy,
The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, supra note 149, at 211-13. Compare Richard Del-
gado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the Fundamental Contradiction Have a
Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407 (1988).
203 "[Rlacism runs counter to the body of public principles that form our national
ethos, including fairness, egalitarianism and humanitarianism .... Americans are influ-
enced by ... public ... norms." Delgado, supra note 181, at 317.
204 Id. at 318. The fraternity-style racial harassment that has broken out on college
campuses around the country is a gloomy exampk of these insights. See, e.g., "In the
Face of Racism," U.: The National College Newspaper, September 1988, at 4, and
"Deep Racial Divisions Persist in New Generation at College," New York Times, May
22, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
205 I am not suggesting we ignore or abandon formal protections. On the relative
importance of formal defenses for those traditionally disempowered and excluded, see
Williams, supra note 41, at 407-09.
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value of Delgado's observations about white behavior, it is also im-
perative to realize that any strategy based on formal norms and
sanctions inevitably depends on the good will of those with the pres-
ent social power to create and impose them. It would be folly for
African Americans or other minorities to place any long-term hope
or faith in the good will of those whites who are in a position to
control and implement such norms and sanctions in our society.
And if that is so, then strategies built solely on formal protections
are built on sand.
More positively stated, people of color do not have to go it
alone.20 6 Many white people in our system need deep societal
changes despite the undeniable benefits they gain from white
supremacy. Given our history, whites will be just as unable to
achieve such change alone as minorities are.
Strategic weakness for these whites does not come from lack of
numbers. In order to be strong enough to move toward change,
people must be able to understand the large questions of power and
justice in their society. They must become students of those who
have encountered and taken up those questions. In this society,
race is one of those important questions of power and justice, one
on a very short list of the most important. People in America who
fail to see and understand white supremacy can and will be stopped
time and again in their own tracks. For this reason, whites and
blacks needing change are in a position of mutual dependence.
Bringing an end to white supremacy, and otherwise redistrib-
uting power and resources, will require the union of many kinds of
people who have suffered many kinds of harms, sometimes even at
each other's hands. Nothing in history has shown either that white
supremacy will end, or that it cannot end, through such a coming
together.
The problem of vision in the race model has another aspect. A
race model faces more than the problem of how to achieve change
when those who need it are a disempowered minority. It must also
deal with what the future would hold if we could bring about the
206 Professor Williams says:
I am... not one of those who believes that the future and well-being
of blacks lie solely with ourselves. Although I don't always yet trust this
imagery of dependence, I think it is the reality, and necessity, if balanced
coexistence is to occur. Blacks cannot be aluiie in this recognition, how-
ever. Whites, too, must learn to appreciate the communion of blacks in
more than body, as more than the perpetually neotenized, mothering
non-mother. They must recognize us as kin .... They must learn to
listen and speak to the grieving, enraged black-people-within-themselves
and within our society.
Id. at 429.
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change we seek. If race is the sole axis of the model, then the vision
of the "good society" that it projects is problematic.
The logic of an unmodified race model in this regard appears
unavoidable. The good society, the non-racist society, is one of two
things: a self-contained black society that (somehow) has separated
itself from the problem of white racism (the vision of an independ-
ent black nation); or instead a society that is racially mixed but
(somehow) has rearranged itself so that blacks are treated and situ-
ated precisely like whites (the vision of equal stratification). In our
society the latter vision would mean that blacks would be arrayed
across the class spectrum in the same (grossly unequal) proportions
as whites, would exercise control over their own lives in the same
(grossly unequal) degree as whites, and would enjoy access to mate-
rial resources in the same (grossly unequal) manner as whites.
Neither vision is currently advanced as a goal by civil rights
scholars. The reasons for this are not hard to summon. The vision
of an independent black nation suffers from the odds against its re-
alization. Derrick Bell tries to provide a separatist pole for the di-
lemma confronting the characters in his book by having one of his
supernatural "curia sisters" advocate black emigration. 20 7 This de-
vice works heuristically but has little persuasive force as a real op-
tion. Predominant opinion has tended to marginalize nationalism,
to push it to the edge and beyond respectable academic discus-
sion. 20 8 The differing treatment of Malcolm X and Martin Luther
King by mainstream cultural organs (like those that are educating
our children) is emblematic.20 9 Even accounting for this bias, how-
ever, visions of a separate black society must be so modified to feel
plausible that they encounter the same problems they were meant to
overcome.
The vision of an equally stratified society is a more plausible
(and socially acceptable) goal for American civil rights scholars, but
it is not being explicitly advanced in the literature any more than the
separatist vision.2 10 A likely reason for this silence is that most civil
207 D. BELL, supra note 3, at 188-90.
208 An exception to the silence about black nationalism in legal academic writing is
Donald Hall, Paths to Equality: A Constitutional Theoly of Collective Rights, 5 HARV. BLACK-
LETrERJ. 27 (1988).
209 On a grass-roots level, consciousness may, of course, be otherwise. The Boston
Globe recently reported that 25% of black residents polled favored the secession of
Roxbury from the city of Boston and the formation of an independent city to be called
Mandela. This is obviously not a majority, nor is it i trivial percentage. Leaders Get Low
Performance Rating, Boston Globe, June 14, 1988, at 10, col. 6. Since this Article was
written, Spike Lee has taken an eloquent stab at projecting Malcolm X uncomfortably
back into mainstream view in his film, Do the Right Thing. It comes as a shock.
210 The only explicit announcements I have found of the "equal stratification vision"




rights advocates do not really accept equal stratification as an ulti-
mate goal. Rather, the civil rights movement has projected a deeper
aspiration than mere equivalent treatment. The animating spirit of
the civil rights movement was "Freedom," not "Equal Opportu-
nity."2 1' Its driving vision was the creation of a transformed and
transforming community whose members would treat each other
with respect and dignity, where the last would come to be first, and
where each person would be a cherished member. No one who was
part of that movement would have recognized as an acceptable out-
come a world in which blacks ended up as a collection of competing
individuals, the racial ceiling on individual achievement for the lucky
few removed at last, but the vast majority still poor and powerless.
Mrs. Hamer said it best: "We didn't come all this way for no two
seats when ALL of us is tired." 21 2
Civil rights scholars who stress race over class appear to do so
most often out of a sense that looking away from race will end up
hurting blacks, again submerging the needs and demands of black
people to one more white project. Few of them would embrace the
vision of a mirror-image stratified black population as even coming
close to the goals that got them involved in the civil rights move-
ment and civil rights scholarship in the first place.
[T]he notion of racial equality ... postulates that in a society that is in-
trinsically hierarchical, blacks should simply share equally in the general
inequality .... I am left with the sense that all would be right with the
world . . . if 10% of all Wall Street lawyers were black and 10% of all
college professors were black and, dare I say it, 10% of all NBA basket-
ball players, 10% of all doctors and 10% of all executive officers of major
corporations were black.
Darity, supra note 198, at 978, 980.
Alan Freeman states: "There is nothing particularly radical about the goal of end-
ing racial discrimination. The goal would be achieved if nonwhites were stratified across
American society in percentages similar to whites. The class structure would remain
intact." Freeman, Race and Class, supra note 146, at 1895.
211 Of course an impoverished formalized version of what the struggle was about has
also been voiced and, especially in the legal world, has had effects. Phraseology can
sometimes be striking. In the midst of a powerful announcement that the thirteenth
amendment had been resurrected and was to have power over a broad range of social
conditions and practices, the Supreme Court fell into the thinnest and most anemic vi-
sion of equal stratification as the goal, announcing that its aims were to assure that "a
dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a
white man" and to protect the freedom of blacks "to buy whatever the white man can
buy." Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968). In defense of the Court, the
Jones opinion may simply express the notion that equal "dollarhood" is a minimal defini-
tion of equality. The words, however, have a nasty ring in today's environment.
212 The occasion was the 1964 Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City.
Mrs. Hamer was urging rejection of the two token seats proffered by the Democratic
National Committee to the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. See Eyes on the Prize,
supra note 18, Episode 5. For a more detailed discussion of the battle at the convention,
see, e.g., T. GrrLIN, supra note 5; HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEw ABoLrrloNlsTs 251-57
(1965).
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A second reason that the vision of "equal stratification" has sel-
dom been held up for scrutiny is that even this paltry vision is so far
from coming true that it can simply be ignored. The realities of the
civil rights struggle, where it is painfully obvious that blacks have
NOT been able to achieve even the dubious goal of equal stratifica-
tion, have prevented people from having to confront the unsatisfac-
tory nature of this implicit goal of a pure race model. 213 The
instances of continuing disparity between blacks and whites are glar-
ing enough and infuriating enough to absorb most of our attention,
or to make speculations about ultimate goals seem superfluous.
Nevertheless, the fact that so much injustice, oppression and
inequality would remain for the vast majority of whites and blacks
under an equal stratification solution indicates that the race model is
inadequate for people motivated by a desire for a radically more
humane and egalitarian society. The wisdom of both the race and
class models are needed.
IV
"WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?"
A. Race and Class
In the real world of civil rights scholarship no pure models ex-
ist. The themes of race and class refuse to keep their bounds. They
constantly interpenetrate, converge, and reflect on each other. The
work of civil rights scholars reflects the fact that it is impossible to
ignore realities that are as powerfully operative and intricately inter-
twined as race and class. 2 14 Of course, we clearly can and do reach
different conclusions about them.215
It may be worth juxtaposing a few statements by civil rights
scholars to give a flavor of the ways they presently acknowledge and
deal with issues of race and class:
To deal with the roots of American racism [by focusing on the
history of racial attitudes and ideas] ... is not to ignore the crucial
213 Derrick Bell suggests that the maddening realities of white supremacy may actu-
ally obscure for people of color the degree of inequality and constraint that exists
among whites. He notes that blacks have long sought "the bias-free opportunity that
seems to them the birthright of every American who is or can pass for a white person."
Bell, Hurdle, supra note 16, at 2 (Derrick Bell speaking) (emphasis added). One of my
students, a black woman who was one of the first students to integrate a local high
school, recalls her shock at discovering that some of her white classmates were "dumb"
in chemistry, ill-prepared for class, and displayed all the signs of coming from a disad-
vantaged background.
214 See Crenshaw, supra note 130. Professor Crenshaw asks us to see the interpene-
tration and convergence in particular ways, pointing out the "distinct racial nature of
class ideology." Id. at 1384.
215 Or, perhaps more often, we float in a confusing kind of pluralist sea of no
conclusions.
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matters of economic exploitation and social degradation. Without
those factors we would have no racism as we know it. But to say,
as many have done, that racism is merely the rationalizing ideol-
ogy of the oppressor, is to advance a grievous error. To rest the
analysis there is to close one's eyes to the complexity of human
oppression. 216
No one can deny that racism is a distinct and historically separate
form of oppression. The statement is almost superfluous, given
the actual life experience of people who have been or who are
being so oppressed. But that fact does not by itself suggest that it
is a problem that can be understood by itself as a separate prob-
lem. However separate its origins and historical practices may be,
racism must be confronted today within the context of contempo-
rary American capitalist society. 217
The error of seeing the plight of the black poor as a consequence
of racism alone should not now be transformed into that of view-
ing their plight as a consequence of classism only.21 8
[We must take account of] the growing significance of the interac-
tion between class and race and American race relations.
Although the evidence is persuasive that social class factors are
becoming increasingly important, there is little evidence that ra-
cial factors are any less important ... .219
There is a big debate over the autonomy of racism. Some
argue that it is a reflection of economic forces, a component of the
capitalist system. Others contend that it is a force in its own right
and not a reflection of the dynamics of capitalism.
Clearly, it has to be dealt with in the capitalist system .... 22o
The underlying theoretical question is not whether racism in
all of its continuing manifestations is or is not different from class
relations generally-because it surely is different-but the extent
to which anything significant can be done about the concededly
unique problem of racism without paying attention to class struc-
ture and the forces that maintain it.2 2 1
Reading this discourse, one gets the odd sensation of having
come full circle. Is there any disagreement here? What are they
arguing about? I believe that there are important differences,
although they are sometimes muddled ones. 22 2
First, partially suppressed issues of distrust animate some of
216 W. JORDAN, supra note 131, at ix.
217 Freeman, Race and Class, supra note 146, at 1891.
218 Calmore, supra note 15, at 204.
219 Thomas Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 685 (1985).
220 Bell, Hurdle, supra note 16, at 29 (Sidney Willhelm speaking).
221 Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 110.
222 Of course, there is a simple question of emphasis. When one person says, "Of
course X, but be ever-so-careful not to forget Y!" and the other person says the reverse,
we can easily see which factor each thinks has priority and which factor is in danger of
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these debates and ought to be brought to the surface. In a parallel
vein, Randall Kennedy has recently tried to uncover and explore
what he describes as a level of "covert discourse" in affirmative ac-
tion debate. 223 His remarks deserve quotation at some length:
[T]here remains a disturbing lacuna in the scholarly debate.
Whether racism is partly responsible for the growing opposition
to affirmative action is a question that is virtually absent from
many of the leading articles on the subject. These articles typi-
cally portray the conflict over affirmative action as occurring in the
context of an overriding commitment to racial fairness and equal-
ity shared by all the important participants in the debate .... This
portrait, however, of conflict-within-consensus is all too genial
.... It ignores those who believe that much of the campaign
against affirmative action is merely the latest in a long series of
white reactions against efforts to elevate the status of the Negro
.... [C]onventional scholarship leaves largely unexamined the
possibility that the campaigns against affirmative action now being
waged by political, judicial and intellectual elites reflect racially
selective indifference, antipathy born of prejudice, or strategies
that seek to capitalize on widespread racial resentments. 224
Like long-time spouses who intimately anticipate each other's
moves and become locked in an argument that appears strangely
trivial or incoherent on the surface, affirmative action partisans may
actually be struggling with deeper issues and apprehensions than is
apparent at first glance. Kennedy says they react "in large measure
from their fears regarding the ulterior motives of their oppo-
nents," 225 and reports that their "suspicions corrode reasoned
discourse." 226
Professor Kennedy focuses primarily on the affirmative action
debate and the suspect motives of those who he believes "have
never authentically repudiated the 'old style religion' of white
supremacy." 227 Nevertheless, his observations are applicable to the
race-class debate as well. Those who emphasize class in analyzing
white supremacy are not "old style" supremacists. Still, their insis-
tence on moving "beyond" race and their reiteration of the peren-
nial "yes, but... " can be a cause for serious unease among people
of color wary of one more back seat ride. When, as is often the case,
the "class" advocate is white and the "race" advocate is a person of
being lost and needs defending. This tension over choice of emphasis is certainly occur-
ring in this debate, but there is more.
223 Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1328.
224 Id. at 1337-39.
225 Id. at 1345-46.
226 Id. at 1345.
227 Id. at 1328.
1052 [Vol. 74:993
CIVIL RIGHTS SCHOLARSHIP
color, the dynamic of distrust can be particularly potent.2 28
One thesis of this Article is that scholars stressing class as a cen-
tral aspect of white supremacy should devote genuine and sustained
attention to people of color and their relationships to whites and to
the legal system. It is also crucial that civil rights scholars who focus
on race as the key to white supremacy give attention to issues of
class.
Given the class situation of most civil rights scholars, it will re-
quire special effort and investment to remind ourselves of the life
situations and the legal perspectives of those who do not share our
privilege. And we will, if we are watching, often catch ourselves dis-
playing selective indifference or worse.229 The task becomes even
more difficult when we try consciously to think about race and class
simultaneously. It is all too easy for any of us to make serious and
distorting "errors of inclusion and exclusion" in these contexts. 230
228 For some sense of the complex dynamics of distrust as they can be played out
across racial and doctrinal lines among the wounded and wounding selves of civil rights
scholars, see Harlan Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435 (1987)
(discussing relations between Conference on Critical Legal Studies and minority
participants).
229 Though seldom approaching the virulence of racism, our class attitudes are
sometimes laden with more than simple selective indifference. As someone who has
spent some (but not enough) time working with, for, and beside poor and working-class
white Southerners, I felt as though I'd been slapped in the face when I reached the end
of Robert Gordon's eloquent reply to Paul Carrington's repugnant attack on CLS, and
found him signing off with: "I'm an old admirer of yours .... You have too much class
to be consorting with the rednecks of our profession." Robert W. Gordon, "Of Law and
the River, "and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 9 (1985) (emphasis
added).
230 Class is not the only axis of difference that we suppress. For example, when we
think of race, we may forget gender. Take the following passage, written by a person
who has many insightful things to say about race, and ask yourself whether it is accepta-
ble when you force the idea of women to the surface of the word "whites":
Whites were trained to aggrandize themselves, to love and respect
themselves, to have initiative, narcissism, sense of entitlement, and to
master external realities. Blacks were trained to surrender and sacrifice
themselves, to trust others, to be simple and forthright, to love and re-
spect others, to accept persecution, to devalue themselves, to defeat
themselves, and to seek direction from others.
Charles A. Pinderhughes, Understanding Black Power: Processes and Proposals, 125 AM. J.
PsYcHIATRY 1552, 1554 (1969) (emphasis added). Pinderhughes's vision suppresses the
reality of white women and of black men and women by omitting gender. It is simply
not true that white women, in relation to white men, are taught a sense of mastery and
entitlement, or taught to expect that the "other" will surrender, sacrifice, or take direc-
tion. Nor does this description of "blacks" provide much help in describing the rela-
tions between black women and men. In fact, we can easily imagine this passage as a
feminist tract were we simply to substitute "Men" for "Whites" and "Women" for
"Blacks."
But this insight, for all its power, backfires and shows the distortion of reality that a
pure gender lens can produce when race and class are omitted from vision.
Pinderhughes was speaking of slave society. As soon as we realize that, we suddenly see
that gender labels would also fail to capture the truth. That formulation crumbles as
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B. Affirmative Action: A Reprise
It is my conviction that civil rights scholarship must take both
race and class, both white supremacy and capitalism, as serious and,
at least presently, inextricable objects of study and action. Beyond
the level of platitude, what might this mean?
I propose to return briefly to the area of doctrine where we be-
gan: affirmative action and its new star, the innocent victim. I be-
lieve the insights of all three models, the class domination model,
the class legitimation model, and the race model, have light to shed
on this subject. Together they may help us find our way toward a
theory, model, or method that would properly recognize the power
of, and the relationship between, race and class.
The class domination model, with its vision of racism as deriva-
tive and supportive of class domination, 231 would insist that one try-
ing to understand the twists and turns of race remediation and
affirmative action must look to underlying economic realities. I
agree with that insistence. The current state of economic regimes
and race law around the globe should disabuse us of the notion that
any one set of economic relations or conditions necessarily entails
one rigidly correspondent set of race relations. Nevertheless, the
economic structure and the level of technology clearly limit pos-
sibilities, exert pressures, and define sticking points about race that
are significant.
The wisdom of the class domination model presses certain
questions upon us. Were there changes in United States national
and regional economies in the 1950s that made segregation less
profitable than before? Were those for whom segregation was most
profitable declining in power and influence? Has America's entry
into the ranks of declining capitalist economies had important ef-
fects on the availability of race remediation to people of color?232 Is
soon as we force the race and class aspects of "Black" and "Enslaved" to the surface of
the category "Men," and similarly force "White plantation mistress" to the surface of
the category "Women."
We must therefore recognize that the characteristics we associate with race or gen-
der or class are complex and relational. The generalizations we often make along one
axis (such as white-&-black, male-&-female, owner-&-worker) turn out to be, at best,
over-simplified when we force the other axes into view. Bell Hooks has plowed impor-
tant ground on this subject. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO
CENTER (1984). Some white feminists are now also trying to address it. See, e.g., E. SPEL-
MAN, supra note 182. For some sense of the difficulties involved, cf. Bell Hooks, The
Politics of Radical Black Subjectivity, Zeta Magazine, Vol. 2, No. 4, 52 at 55 (criticizing the
work of "white feminist theoretical elites in the United States" for continuing to
marginalize the work of women of color in the very effort to respond to and build upon
their work).
231 See supra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
232 Many civil rights scholars of varying stripes appear to believe that the decline of
the economy is a factor. See, e.g., Freeman, Race and Class, supra note 146, at 1895 (noting
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racism profitable to powerful North American economic interests on
a global (even if not a national) scale, and if so, has that affected the
domestic struggle against white supremacy?
Civil rights scholars need to ask themselves these questions, to
keep the door open to "non-legal" issues and projects, so that they
may move more effectively toward workable answers. The questions
remind us that the trend toward privatization in affirmative action
cases, the trend toward seeing the heart of white supremacy as a
conflict between two workers, leaves out too much of the picture to
yield a just result.
The class models suggest that Joe 23 3 is indeed a victim though
not an "innocent" one. They would see him as a victim in two
senses. He is victimized first by the inequality and injustice of his
relationships to those in power, by his lack of control over social
decisions, by his economic dependency, and by his inequitably small
share of social resources. He is victimized in a second sense when
he is required to bear a disproportionate share (vis-a-vis more privi-
leged whites) of the burdens and dislocations of race
remediation. 23 4
The class models recognize the victimization of the white
worker disappointed by affirmative action. They do not, however,
define his victimization in the way that most current affirmative ac-
tion cases do. The aspiring black is not the real cause of the harm to
the white worker, nor is the affirmative action disappointment the
main inequity in the white worker's situation. The class model
would press for affirmative action that recognized class inequities
and that attempted to place more of the remedial burden on those
with more of the power and resources to bear them.
The class legitimation model also draws our attention to other
issues. It argues that the security and stability of any legal regime
depend largely on the consensus and acquiescence of the majority.
the problem of a "stagnant or dwindling economy");Jordan, Foreword in W. BEARDSLEE,
supra note 18, at ix ("Today, the pie is shrinking, and we see an effort to push black
people and poor people away from the table again.").
233 See party scenario, supra text following note 42.
234 Freeman decries the "evasion of remedial burdens by the rich, since American
law sees no formal differences based on wealth," and notes that "a regime of formal
equality will ensure that the dislocative impact [of race remediation is disproportion-
ately borne by lower-class whites (not to mention blacks, who are burdened either
way)." Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 11. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974), symbolizes the refusal to visit such dislocation on affluent white suburbs while
proceeding "apace" with respect to inner city neighborhoods. See also Elizabeth
Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982).
Freeman elaborates in another article: "American society (or some dominant por-
tion of it) has committed itself (or did) to remedying its historical problem of race, but
has made not even the pretense of such a commitment with respect to class. The disap-
pointed white worker is a class victim." Freeman, Race and Class, supra note 146, at 1895.
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It sees the slow-down in race remediation as a move to fend off
destabilization of a deep American consensus around the notion of
individual rights and formal equality. This may explain why race
remediation moved forward as long as racial progress was linked to
a call for formal equality. However, once Jim Crow was defeated
and formal equality was achieved, the ideology of equal opportunity
became a straitjacket on racial progress. It legitimated, rather than
challenged, racial injustice. 23 5
This insight suggests that civil rights scholars need to unearth
and collectively scrutinize the elements of the deep consensus, to
educate ourselves and others about its specific and contingent his-
torical roots, 23 6 to point out its internal contradictions, to question
its appropriateness for the questions and issues now confronting us
and to imagine alternatives.
Such a project is not necessarily quixotic. The American con-
sensus on formal equality is wide and deep in some ways, but it is
also largely unexamined and fraught with contradictions. After all,
many people accommodated the ethic of segregation for years with-
out sensing an intolerable tension with ideals of formal equality.
When massive citizen activism disturbed and questioned that ethic,
things changed.
Americans share some important core ideas, but few of these
ideas are immovable or inherently indissoluble. Together with our
strong notions about formal equality, our common sense demands
that equality mean something real. 237 More people need to see and
235 In this instance, the ironies of formal equality for blacks find a striking parallel in
the effects of formal equality for women in the "divorce revolution." Women fought for
the formal equality so long denied to them in marriage laws, only to find themselves
grossly disadvantaged by fanciful presumptions of equality and gender-blindness in a
world where the earning power and financial needs of divorcing wives are in most in-
stances grossly disproportionate to those of husbands.
236 Some current revivalist work on "republicanism" in our constitutional history
goes far in this direction, recovering some sense of the openness and option that is our
past and future. There are different ways to put democracy together with a constitution.
We have tried a few of them in our time, have seriously considered many more, and still
have only scratched the surface. Sadly, too many of us suffer from the American forget-
ting disease, so we lose the wisdom some of this experience might afford. See, e.g.,Joyce
Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HIST. 798 (1987);
Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward a Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE
LJ. 1623 (1988); Frank Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1986); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Cass Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539 (1988); Note, The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ. 694 (1985)
(authored by William Michael Treanor). See also Bell & Bansal, supra note 185.
237 Of course, the idea that formal rights constrain and retard substantive justice
predates the civil rights scholarship of our era. Max Weber articulated the tension quite
clearly:
Formal justice guarantees the maximum freedom for the interested par-
ties to represent their formal legal interests. But because of the unequal
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appreciate the tension between formal and substantive equality, and
legal scholars can and should help them do so. 23 8
The class legitimation model teaches that civil rights scholars
who try to assimilate and accept formal equality unmodified will
founder upon it. To accept or ignore class division and its ideologi-
cal justifications at this juncture is to forfeit power to deal with race
in a meaningful way. The affirmative action cases most painfully
demonstrate this reality.
The teaching of the race model also has important bearing on
affirmative action. One cannot realistically attempt to understand
the "reverse discrimination" backlash without fully acknowledging
whites' powerfully internalized and resistant racism. The race
model pushes us to admit that many of the expectations of disap-
pointed white "innocent victims" are deeply race-bound expecta-
tions. Many white people want and need (whether consciously or
not) to feel superior to people of color.23 9 Superiority is itself an im-
distribution of economic power, which the system of formal justice legal-
izes, this very freedom must time and again produce consequences which
are contrary to ... substantive postulates .... [F]ormaljustice due to its
necessarily abstract character, infringes upon the ideals of substantive
justice.
2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SociErY 812, 813 (G. Roth & C. Witticks eds. 1978).
238 1 suspect that some effort in this direction by certain scholars associated with
Critical Legal Studies prompted the famous attack on "rights" that has been a source of
recent controversy. Mark Tushnet described rights as part of "capitalism's culture" that
progressive people should reject. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TFx. L. REV.
1363, 1363 (1984). Duncan Kennedy called them "deeply anti-radical." Kennedy,
Antonio Gramsci, supra note 149, at 37.
The promulgators of the critique of rights, however, failed to appreciate the trans-
formed (or partially transformed) meaning of rights in late 20th-century America. They
were soon reminded of it by some of those (particularly women and minorities) who had
recently struggled to gain recognition of various legal rights. These people objected to
the critics' characterization of all rights thinking as pacifying and limiting. They pointed
with pride to gains, not simply in legal protections, but also in the sense of empower-
ment and collective strength, that had resulted for those who invented, fought for, and
won new rights. They argued forcefully that those in struggle for rights were often
keenly aware that rights were deeply political. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic
of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women 's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986);
Williams, supra note 41; Williams, supra note 42. These widely-noted and often dazzling
defenses of rights deserve direct acknowledgment from those who launched the critique,
few of whom appear to embrace any longer (if they ever did) the hard one-dimensional
position that so disturbed those who struggled over the rights of women and minorities.
See Duncan Kennedy, Critical Labor Law Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL. LJ. 503, 506
(1981) ("We need to work at the slow transformation of rights rhetoric, at dereifying it,
rather than simply junking it."). Some responses have now appeared. See Morton Hor-
witz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1988), Freeman, Racism, Rights, supra note
14.
Civil rights scholars do need to confront the underside of rights, the Lochnerian side,
the form-over-substance side, the anti-redistributive side, if they seek a coherent ap-
proach to race and law. See also Crenshaw, supra note 130.
239 Perhaps analogous to the way that so many men need to feel superior to women
as a part of their own internal sense of equilibrium.
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portant source of felt well-being, a supportive ingredient in self-con-
cept. The actual entitlement may be less significant than its ranking
function.
I believe that many whites harbor and vent deep emotions of
fear, revulsion and resentment at the notion of black liberation, of
black destabilization of the status quo. I further believe that the
force of this sentiment has made itself felt in the courts. White pop-
ular backlash alone cannot adequately explain the judicial retreat
from race remediation and the shape of affirmative action doctrine,
but it clearly tells part of the story. It is recognition of these realities
and disgust at the practical effects of reverse discrimination doctrine
that likely prompted one civil rights scholar's call for total rejection
of the notion of an "innocent victim." ' 240 In this view the term is
rotten to the core. There is no such thing as an innocent white vic-
tim of affirmative action. There is no value in distinguishing among
whites affected by affirmative action, nor in trying to determine
whether some should bear more responsibility than others. 24'
This position misses the mark. One cannot deny deny the fact
that in some ways, some disappointed whites are class victims. More
importantly, one cannot deny the differing interests and responsibil-
ity of the white worker and the white employer. Nonetheless, race
model insights remind us that white victims are likely to be at least
partially complicit, rather than purely "innocent," and the victims
are almost certainly the beneficiaries of discriminatory patterns,
whether consciously so or not.
The race model also reminds us that racial oppression does dif-
fer from class oppression, and does harm its victims in particular and
egregious ways. Blacks, therefore, assert with authority a special
race-related, historically-rooted claim upon the American legal sys-
tem. No affirmative action solution that asks blacks to wait until
whites are "convinced," or to rely on the chance of rising passively
with the rest of the bread, or to defer to racism in the interests of
"class unity," will work. Such a solution would leave a racist sub-
stratum unconfronted, and thereby be crippled from the start.
Clearly, then, we must integrate insights of both the class and
race models in the thorny area of affirmative action. I want to out-
line some directions for future work by civil rights scholars, sug-
gested by the problems discussed, that illustrate how we might
incorporate both models. I will begin with a brief outline of some
240 See Robert Belton, Reflections on Affirmative Action After Paradise and Johnson, 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 115, 137 (1988) ("I suggest we... drop this notion of'innocent
victim.' It's a red herring.").
241 Id. ("I'm not so sure that the employer is any more responsible than individuals
for what has happened.").
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methodological questions, and then sketch several specific projects I
would encourage scholars to pursue.
C. Methodology
Questions of methodology are currently in dispute among civil
rights scholars. This dispute is part of the crossroads we currently
face.
Traditionally, the bulk of civil rights scholarship has spun itself
out in litigation and in the law journals, within the bounds of con-
ventional doctrinal analysis. There is, of course, a virtual jugger-
naut of material concerning equal protection jurisprudence,
"preferential treatment," and the ebb and flow (mostly ebb these
days) 24 2 of evolving doctrine about the scope of actionable civil
rights violations and remedies.
A number of scholars voice deep skepticism about continuing
this conventional form of scholarship.243 Their skepticism some-
times arises from a general disillusionment with the ability of law to
do much for people of color, and sometimes from a sense that schol-
arship must move beyond the busy surface of doctrinal debate to
reveal larger, deeper patterns. Derrick Bell observed:
Legal analysis is inadequate to address these questions. Even a
command of social science principles far beyond my ability would
hardly suffice to provide the depth of vision necessary to compare
the bleak landscape of America's race relations in 1984 with the
expectations of imminent racial equality in 1954. In a setting so
removed from that more optimistic time, it now seems appropri-
ate to seek guidance in fiction, particularly that folk fiction so
filled with symbolic meaning, the fairy tale.244
Bell's recent book bears the fuller fruit of this idea, using a series of
242 Since this Article was written, the "ebb" has become a rip-tide. See, e.g., Jett v.
Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109
S. Ct. 2180 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
243 It is worth noting that the skepticism and experimentation extend not only to
scholarship, but to pedagogy as well. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, 1989-90 MANUAL OF SUP-
PLEMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR RACE, RACISM & AMERICAN LAw (1989); Gerald Lopez,
Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal
Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989); Kiniberl W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a
Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, I I NATIONAL BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Mari Mat-
suda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowyledge: Planting 'eedf in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988); see also HenryJ. Richardson, Black Lau) Professors and the Integrity of
American Legal Education, 4 BLACK LAwJ. 495 (1974). In these pedagogical stretchings
civil rights scholars again show kinship with feminist legal scholars. See generally Sympo-
sium, Women in Legal Education: Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. Nos.
1 & 2 (1988).
244 Bell, Fairy Tale, supra note 27, at 334 (footnote omitted).
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fantastic "chronicles" to explore the pain and possibility of civil
rights law. 24 5 In his introduction he explains: "In order to appraise
the contradictions and inconsistencies that pervade the all too real
world of racial oppression, I have chosen in this book the tools not
of reason but of unreason ... .",246 This methodology resulted in a
book remarkably accessible to non-law-trained readers.
Several civil rights scholars associated with Critical Legal Stud-
ies also reject traditional forms of legal scholarship. Alan Freeman,
for example, takes a stance that is quite disengaged from either liti-
gation or traditional constitutional discourse:
The purpose of the discussion is descriptive and explanatory, not
prescriptive or normative. [This law journal] Article is not a doc-
trinal brief; no attempt will be made to reconcile new arguments
with existing case law or find instances for optimism in the inter-
stices of depressing Supreme Court opinions .... Those issues
are simply irrelevant to an author seeking to observe and report
on evolution of legal doctrine rather than to participate in its
manipulation.2 4
7
Karl Klare, another CLS scholar who has written thoughtfully
about race, also adopts a distinct perspective at some remove.
Although he openly prescribes action for the labor and civil rights
movements, 24 8 he distances himself from the immediate contests rag-
ing in the Supreme Court, and thus avoids submitting his ideas to
the kind of pressure to persuade, even to flatter, that brief writers
and law review authors often experience. Klare tries to take a
longer view, to "explor[e] a series of parallels, convergences and
connections between labor law and civil rights law." 24 9
Scholars sometimes present this methodology not as a matter
of personal preference, or of temporal tactics, but rather as the only
tenable or principled response to the current situation. John
Calmore quotes Mark Tushnet as follows: "Despite the cost in
claims to influence on public policy, then, the post-nihilist legal
scholar must stand apart from the legal system and must attempt to
work with legal materials in some other way." 250
Alan Freeman implies that any "claims to influence" asserted
by those engaging in traditional doctrinal discourse are illusory, so
there is no real cost in withdrawing from such activity:
245 D. BELL, supra note 3.
246 Id. at 5.
247 Freeman, supra note 23, at 1050-5 1.
248 Klare, supra note 60, at 158.
249 Id. at 157.
250 Calmore, supra note 15, at 205 n.17 (citing Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the
American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV.
1307, 1345 (1979)).
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If I were content to stay within the structure of legal ideology
and argument, I would write a brief in favor of the victim perspec-
tive as the appropriate form ofjudicial decision-making in racial-
discrimination cases. But surely the law's refusal to incorporate
the victim perspective has had little to do with either the logic or
effectiveness of legal argument or the subjective wishes of the par-
ticipants in the legal process.2 5 1
In some instances, this stepping back for perspective has al-
lowed great leaps forward in understanding. Freeman's own article
on antidiscrimination law is a case in point. On the other hand, this
detached stance faces increasing criticism. The stratospheric level
of some CLS discourse, with its arcane vocabulary, high level of ab-
straction, cool distance from concrete social or litigational
problems, and refusal to suggest solutions, has faced methodologi-
cal criticism from several sympathetic quarters. Patricia Williams,
for example, spins a fable that ends with a haunting image:
At the bottom of the Deep Blue Sea, drowning mortals reached silently
and desperately for drifting anchors dangling from short chains far, far over-
head, which they thought were life-lines meant for them.... CLS... has
failed to make its words and un-words tangible, reach-able and ap-
plicable to those in this society who need its powerful assistance
most.
2 5 2
What are alternatives, or partners, to scholarship "far, far over-
head"? One approach, of course, is business as usual. Plenty of
cases and doctrinal arguments are published in reporters and law
reviews every day, more than enough to keep scholars busy assimi-
lating and commenting on them. A total renunciation of this system
would impose costs. Moreover, thoughtful articles within this sys-
tem, when informed by a desire to defeat racism, can and have been
helpful: they may articulate certain themes running through a line
251 Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 106. Both here and in Legitimizing Race
Discrimination, supra note 23, Freeman poses a suggestive dichotomy between the "victim
perspective" and the "perpetrator perspective," two radically opposing views of what
white-supremacy is and how it should be remedied. Freeman argues that the victim
perspective (which longs for results, wants remedies for unequal conditions, and for which
group remediation seems perfectly natural) is the one the law should adopt, but that
civil rights law over the past three decades has been the story of the uneven but eventual
triumph of the perpetrator perspective (which wants to restrict remedies to identifiable
victims of individually fault-laden acts of discrimination and whose goal is equal opportu-
nity, not substantively equal conditions of life).
252 Williams, supra note 41, at 402, 403 (emphasis added). Of course, one must ask
whether "those in society who need... assistance most" find traditional civil rights schol-
arship tangible, reachable and applicable. I doubt it. And I do not think that intelligibil-
ity to lay people, or even to the majority of trained readers, is a universal criterion for all
scholarly work. It is one criterion, however, and an important one in some instances,
especially if the work is supposed to be connected in some significant way with the lives
of people in need.
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of cases, 253 or contribute valuable insights about current debates, 254
or even directly address judges on the perils of judging about
race.
25 5
Generally, however, bolder steps are required. Life is short.
Two recent articles256 epitomize another approach. They both do
things that Alan Freeman repudiated; that is, they stay within the
structure of legal ideology and argument, and essentially argue for
actual judicial implementation of the victim perspective as the ap-
propriate form of judicial decision-making in race-discrimination
cases;257 they seek to pry open space for women and people of color
from "the interstices of depressing Supreme Court opinions." 258
Yet both of these articles do something deep and strong enough to
be worth the cost.
In The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism,259 Charles Lawrence undertakes the task of working within
the disastrous rule of Washington v. Davis.260 He proposes to create a
new "test" for discriminatory intent in equal protection cases, a test
that would recognize unconscious racism as the functional equivalent
of discriminatory intent. In the course of spinning out how such a
test would work, he also presents a helpful short-course on the psy-
chology of racism.
Lawrence takes pains to argue that his approach is in harmony
with existing equal protection theories, and attempts a precise dem-
onstration of how his proposed "cultural meaning test" for uncon-
scious racism would work in specific cases. Despite the traditional
form of the discussion, however, Lawrence asks the reader to ex-
amine material powerfully opposed to the crippled and blindered
notion of intentional discrimination that now effectively impedes
much meaningful racial remediation. Lawrence's article signifies in-
fusion of racial consciousness-raising into traditional legal scholarly
debate.
253 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 61, at 78 (tracing talk of fault and innocence in the
Supreme Court affirmative active decision of the 1986 term, and suggesting problems
with the Court's approach).
254 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories, 72 IOWA L.
REV. 281 (1987) (pointing out the irony that an originalist interpretation of equal pro-
tection doctrine would be fully supportive of affirmative action for blacks).
255 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10 (1987)
and Frank Michelman, The Meanings of Legal Equality, 3 HARV. BLACKLETrERJ. 24 (1986).
256 Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1003 (1986); Lawrence, supra note 36.
257 See supra text accompanying note 247.
258 Freeman, supra note 23, at 1051.
259 See Lawrence, supra note 36.
260 426 U.S. 229 (1976). This case holds that practices that have a disparate impact
on blacks are nonetheless immune to constitutional challenge on equal protection
grounds unless intentional discrimination can be proven.
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Direct participation in constitutional conversations can be im-
portant. The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomina-
tion of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court were only one
particularly strong illustration of the notion that when Americans
fight out important questions about the good life and about public
and private morality, we often do so on the stage of constitutional
law.261
Alan Freeman himself has noted that "civil rights law serves as
much more than 'just law.' It serves also as the evolving statement
of dominant moral consciousness .... ,262 Lawrence observes that
blacks have a special interest in such public conversations, because
the "and other historically stigmatized and excluded groups have no
small stake in the promotion of an explicitly normative debate." 263
On the other hand, Lawrence is not naive about the likelihood that
his argument will sweep today's Supreme Court off its feet: "I do
not anticipate that either the Supreme Court or the academic estab-
lishment will rush to embrace and incorporate the approach this ar-
ticle proposes . . . . Rather, it is my hope that the preliminary
thoughts expressed in the preceding pages will stimulate others to
think about racism in a new way . . "264
I agree with Lawrence that even properly steely-eyed survivors
of the civil rights struggle, fully aware of the absorbing, legitimizing
and profoundly resistant powers of the law, should sometimes con-
tribute actual proposals to the doctrinal conversation, that they
should not always "stand aside. ' 265 Alternative doctrinal formula-
tions can be liberating, can remind us, sometimes groggy from the
blows of the Reagan and now post-Reagan eras, that other possibili-
ties exist. However, it takes some daring and imagination to pose a
counter-doctrine that does more than nibble at the edges of distress.
Ruth Colker's article is also within the genre of powerful alter-
natives. 266 Like Professor Lawrence, Professor Colker enters the
standard equal protection arena and has her say, even though for
feminists as well as for civil rights scholars the ironies and limits of
261 See generally Horwitz, supra note 9. See also Morton Horwitz, The Meaning of the Bork
Nomination in American Constitutional Histoiy, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 655 (1989).
262 Freeman, Critical Review, supra note 14, at 96-97.
263 Lawrence, supra note 36, at 386.
264 Id. at 387.
265 See supra note 238 and accompanying text. Of course, when one defends oneself or
one's client in litigation, the consequences of boycotting the discourse are stiff. Mari
Matsuda makes this point by observing that it made good, paradoxical sense for Angela
Davis to tell her jury, "your government lies, but your law is above such lies." Mari
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, II Wo-
MEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7 (1989) (emphasis in original).
266 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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equality-focused struggle have become too obvious to ignore. 267
She advocates replacing the dominant interpretation of anti-dis-
crimination principle (an interpretation she calls the "anti-differen-
tiation") with a different animating rationale for equal protection
activity, the "anti-subordination principle":
[C]ourts should analyze equal protection cases from an anti-sub-
ordination perspective. Under the anti-subordination perspec-
tive, it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to have
subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a
whole. This approach seeks to eliminate the power disparities be-
tween men and women, and between whites and non-whites,
through the development of laws and policies that directly redress
those disparities. 268
Colker's redefinition of the harm to be avoided by equal protec-
tion parallels Randall Kennedy's insight. In an article published in
the same year as Colker's, Kennedy observed:
In the forties, fifties and early sixties, against the backdrop of laws
that used racial distinctions to exclude Negroes from opportuni-
ties available to white citizens, it seemed that racial subjugation
could be overcome by mandating the application of race-blind
law. In retrospect, however, it appears that the concept of race-
blindness was simply a proxy for the fundamental demand that
racial subjugation be eradicated. This demand, which matured over
time in the face of myriad sorts of opposition, focused upon the
condition of racial subjugation .... Brown and its progeny do not
stand for the abstract principle that governmental distinctions
based on race are unconstitutional. Rather, [they] stand for the
proposition that the Constitution prohibits any arrangements im-
posing racial subjugation-whether such arrangements are ostensi-
bly race-neutral or even ostensibly race-blind.
This interpretation... articulates a principle of anti-subjuga-
tion rather than anti-discrimination .... 269
267 For a small sample of the vigorous feminist debate on equality, see, e.g., Lucinda
Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Herma Hill Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. OF ILL. L. REV.
39; Christine Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1043 (1987);
Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Frances
Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois
1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518 (1986); Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 175 (1984); Wendy
Williams, Equality's Riddle, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-85).
268 Colker, supra note 256, at 1007 (footnotes omitted).
269 Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1335-36 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Colker also echoes MacKinnon's earlier formulation that the proper test should be
"whether the policy or practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of
an underclass or a deprived position because of gender status." CATHERINE MACKIN-




These two articulations are more than word play or whistling
Dixie. They offer a welcome and lucid formulation that can radically
help to correct the amnesiac world view underlying most notions of
"reverse discrimination." They are simple and direct enough to
help any woman in the street who finds herself in a yelling match
over affirmative action.2 70 They attempt to revive and launch the
battered "victim perspective" unabashedly into the heart of equal
protection discourse. One need not believe that the equal protec-
tion clause should remain so dominant in the work of civil rights
scholars to believe that dramatic recastings like this are healthy for
the public debate.
Having said all this, however, I nonetheless believe it is vital
that much civil rights scholarship depart from traditional litigation-
bound discourse. This departure might adopt the methodology of
CLS's celestial levitation above the realities of recent court deci-
sions. Important work has already been done in that mode and
should continue.
This departure might also take the form of burrowing under-
ground. What if legal scholars began, not with the stars, but with
the roots? Mari Matsuda suggests several ways to take a productive
part in civil rights scholarship by adopting an "expanded method of
inquiry, akin to feminist consciousness-raising," '27' and by con-
sciously looking "to the bottom" for guidance and renewal. 272 In
particular, Matsuda proposes the approaches outlined below.
First, civil rights scholars should follow and support the actual
organizing struggles of people "on the bottom," discussing and
learning from them, and trying to function as "theoretical co-con-
spirators." 273 Second, civil rights scholars should engage in con-
sciousness-raising about race and class. 274 For Matsuda this would
270 I would maintain that this is not at all a frivolous litmus for testing the helpful-
ness of alternative doctrine. To the contrary, it may be the most important one.
271 Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 331 (1987). She explains: "Consciousness-raising in the feminist
context is the collective discussion and consideration of the concrete, felt experience of
gender in order to identify commonalities and build a theory of the cause, effect and
means of eradication of sexist oppression." Id. at 359.
272 Id. at 332. See also Muhammed Kenyatta, Critical Footnotes to Parker's "Constitutional
Theory", 2 HARV. BLACKLETrERJ. 49, 52 (1985) (calling for civil rights scholars to "recap-
ture our earlier and better humility ... which sought to learn about participation from
the communities of the disenfranchised.").
273 Matsuda, supra note 271, at 348.
274 Id. at 359-60. Matsuda, unfortunately, did not elaborate on this point. One pow-
erful genius of consciousness-raising as developed by the feminist movement is that it is
rooted in each one's own experiences. Matsuda's remarks sound as if she thinks schol-
ars need only look to those (others) on the bottom, and learn about them. I doubt it.
What consciousness-raising about privilege means for those with relatively more privi-
lege may be a difficult question, but certainly the process cannot be restricted to learn-
ing about or empathizing with others. See McIntosh, supra note 167. For an article that
1989] 1065
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
apparently mean listening to "voices from the bottom" as a source
of information, intuition, and normative vision. 275
Scholars involved in such a project must make strenuous efforts
to insure that their theory is informed by contemporary minority
writers and by works from the legal and non-legal "alternative intel-
lectual tradition" 276 of people of color. This effort would require
"conscious alteration of the typical research path... ",277 and recog-
nition that the "choice of sources is political." 278
Regina Austin suggests another method of "burrowing down"
for theory.279 In a speech to minority female civil rights scholars she
urged them to focus on the concrete legal problems of minority wo-
men, to enter the world of the particular, to examine closely the
material conditions and the economic and political status of real wo-
men of color. She gives as examples two projects of her own.
These projects focused on industrial insurance ("the rip-off life in-
surance with the small face amounts that were purchased by my
mother and grandmother") 28 0 and the problem of "excess death" in
majority communities. 28 ' Austin admits that the problems these
projects address are difficult because they "do not begin with a case
and will not necessarily end with a new rule," 28 2 and because they
will often require interdisciplinary work in order to ensure a reliable
empirical base.2 83
However, Austin is convinced the project is worth the difficul-
ties: "It is imperative that we portray, almost construct for our legal
audience, the contemporary reality of the disparate groups of mi-
nority women about whom we write." 28 4 The image is concrete and
takes a close "consciousness-raising" look at law from the perspective of a person of
color, see Peggy Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE LJ. 1559 (1989).
275 Clearly, automatic "Answers" will not be forthcoming, since the voices from the
bottom will be many and often in conflict.
276 Matsuda, supra note 271, at 331.
277 Id. at 343. Matsuda has since elaborated on this theme. Mari Matsuda, Affirmative
Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1988).
278 Id. at 344.
279 See Austin, Sapphire Bound!, supra note 40.
280 Id. at 7.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Since this Article was written, Professor Austin has followed her own advice in an
exemplary article that looks at a concrete set of issues that particularly affect women and
people of color in low-income jobs. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance,
and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1988).
284 Austin, Sapphire Bound!, supra note 40, at 7. Austin's statement bears compari-
son with similar statements by white women scholars seeking to define feminist legal
projects. Professor West, for example, urges us to "tell true stories of women's lives,"
and "flood the market with our own stories until we get one simple point across: Their
story is not our story." Robin West, Masculine Jurisprudence 69-70. See also Peggy Davis &
Richard Dudley, The Black Family in Modern Slavery, 4 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 9 (1987).
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particular. The lawyer's role is both to serve the people and to find
the voices of the silent. 28 5 I find Austin's challenge powerful. We
should embrace this burrowing and digging in the reality of peo-
ple's lives. 28 6
I suggest that there truly is no one project, no one voice, to
which civil rights scholars should conform. But despite and because
of diverse methodologies, choosing and maintaining our loyalties
will be of utmost importance and not always so easy.
D. Projects for Civil Rights Scholars
Civil rights scholars can play a part in helping to "realign the
parties" in the affirmative action debate. Their efforts must main-
tain the kind of attention to race and to class described above. The
projects set forth below may provide fruitful avenues for criticizing
and overcoming the privatization, misalignments and exclusions of
today's affirmative action practice and doctrine.
285 The voice of the silent might be one's own. Several scholars have made daring
contributions by telling their own stories, or consciously using their own experiences to
judge legal doctrine. Derrick Bell, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 3, uses a semi-
autobiographical narrator. His article The Price and Pain of Racial Perspective, supra note
40, opened to public view an incident he experienced at Stanford Law School. (It ap-
pears at present that by taking the risk of self-exposure Bell was able to turn a painful
and subjectively degrading experience into an opportunity for Stanford's institutional
growth. This particular story, therefore, has a happy ending. See Bell, Memorandum,
supra note 40. Patricia Williams's articles, supra note 41, On Being Invisible, 4 HARV.
BLACKLETrER J. 16 (1987), On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNs 5 (1988) and Spirit-
Murdering the Messenger, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987) gain power through the author's
sharing of her own experiences. Lawrence's Unconscious Racism, supra note 36, also uses
personal narrative in instructive ways. See also Freeman, Racism, Rights, supra note 146.
Feminist contributions in this mode include Robin West's breathtaking article, The
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3
WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 81 (1987). Christine Littleton argues, in the context of feminist
work:
[S]ome of the sharing and analysis that occurs within consciousness-
raising groups might be carried on in dialogue within the journals. The
risk of looking "too different" from traditional legal periodicals may ex-
plain much of the absence of the personal voice, but such risks must oft-
times be run lest we legitimize the dehumanizing tone of the distance,
impersonality and "objectivity" so prized by the male establishment.
Christine Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L. REV. 1, 4
n.15 (1987).
286 Richard Delgado's article, Words that Wound, supra note 180, exemplifies scholar-
ship that roots itself in particular experiences endured by people of color and attempts
to "surface" those experiences and suggest ways the law could respond to them. In the
field of feminist legal scholarship, Frances Olsen does a wonderful job of interjecting
and honoring female lives in the midst of fairly traditional constitutional analysis. Fran-
ces Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387 (1984)
(retrieving the experience of the underage rape victim; demanding that she be recog-
nized not only as a target of assault, but also as an autonomous person with sexual
desires; urging a statutory scheme aimed at empowerment rather than "protection").
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1. Modest and Immodest Proposals for Greater Worker Control of the
Work Place
Proposals designed to increase worker control of the work place
should be coupled with thorough critiques of the limited value of
the "management-prerogative defense" of voluntary affirmative ac-
tion programs. They should scrutinize the misuse of affirmative ac-
tion as a tool to undermine collective worker strength and employee
autonomy.2 8 7 It is not racist or sexist for white male workers to ob-
serve that affirmative action often serves as an additional weapon in
management's arsenal of control over labor. Anyone familiar with
Bell's "interest-convergence dilemma" 288 should hardly be sur-
prised to see those in power use whatever pieces wash up on the
industrial relations shore to fashion tools to enhance their control.
In W.R. Grace & Co v. Local Union 759,289 the Supreme Court's
opinion is laden with hints of how creative management can turn
affirmative action to its advantage. The facts recited in the opinion
suggest that such a process might go as follows:
** Employer refuses to hire blacks and women for many years.
Suit is brought on behalf of the excluded.
** Labor dispute arises and white male workers go out on strike.
** During strike first women are hired-as scabs.
** Company rushes to file conciliation agreement with EEOC
that conflicts with labor contract.
** Strike ends, strikers return to work, and now male incum-
bents and female scabs must fight over job slots and seniority,
with the union no doubt seriously weakened as a result.
We need affirmative action schemes that are less susceptible to
such abuse by management. We also need jobs and job security for
the previously excluded.
2. Comparisons of Worker Protection and "White Skin Protection"
There is a startling difference in the way our courts typically
treat white/male job security threatened by affirmative action claim-
ants and the way they treat that job security when it is threatened by
corporate investment decisions. Scholars need to investigate this
difference. The vulnerability of American workers to plant closings
is a public scandal.290 The court's solicitous concern about the
287 For people of color to be put in a position where their welfare depends upon the
anti-racist discretion and management prerogatives of private corporations deprives them
of security. It also exerts a force on the minority person to look to the "bosses" for aid
rather than to the strength of those united by common interests.
288 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
289 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
290 For a closely-reasoned account of how our law could be improved in this regard
without doing conceptual violence to existing norms, see Joseph Singer, The Reliance
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workers' "firmly rooted expectation [s]" 29 1 and action that might
"disrupt seriously [their] lives" 292 in the affirmative action context,
compared to its apparent lack of concern when the threat is not a
racial or sexual one (e.g., veteran's preference, informal admission
networks, remediation for unfair labor practices, plant closings and
other investment decisions of absentee corporations) has prompted
Derrick Bell to remark that courts increasingly recognize a "prop-
erty interest in whiteness. ' 293 It appears all too likely that courts
will protect certain bundles of rights against racial challenge, will
preserve the white person's racially privileged environment, even if
the very same bundles of rights are entirely vulnerable to almost any
other threat.294
This differential treatment only highlights and reinforces the
fact that corporate policies and practices, not the unemployed per-
son of color, pose the more serious threat to the job security of the
American white worker. Perhaps our scholarship could prove this
more clearly.
3. Creative Proposals for Burden Sharing
In many cases the ultimate choice between an affirmative action
claimant and a white and/or male incumbent need not be resolved
solely between the two of them, nor must the "winner" take all. Job
sharing295 and enhanced unemployment benefits present alterna-
tives to unfair lay-offs. Also, front pay may be advanced to one who
must temporarily forgo promotion in order to allow race and gen-
der integration of previously white/male jobs. 296
Ensuring proper inclusion of all relevant victims and perpetra-
tors is essential. Excluded minorities need a voice in decisional
processes. Employers should be held presumptively responsible for
Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). The developing literature on plant clos-
ings is voluminous and interdisciplinary. See, e.g., GILDA HAAS, PLANr CLOSINGS: MyrIS,
REALITIES AND RESPONSES (1985) and BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, PLANT CLOSINGS:
THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE (1988).
291 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 638
(1987). See supra text accompanying notes 93-122.
292 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 189 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
293 Bell, supra note 175, at 12.
294 See id.
295 Mothers (who in most cases remain the primary caretakers of children whether
or not both parents work) and children (who are drastically affected by the entry of
mothers into the paid work place and the failure of most fathers, employers, and "soci-
ety" to make up for the withdrawal of unpaid motherly labor from the home) have addi-
tional reasons for welcoming a non-gender-bound loosening of job boundaries, and a
more employee centered ethic at the work place.
296 See supra note 91. A recent note explores some possibilities in this realm, without
"presum[ing] to resolve the public debate concerning the legitimacy of preferential rem-
edies." Note, Compensating Victims of Preferential Employment Discrimination Remedies, 98
YALE LJ. 1479, 1480 (authored byJ. Hoult Verkerke) (1989).
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all or part of the burden of unequal conditions. Employers' at-
tempts, in a concessionist climate, to force workers to redistribute
burdens entirely among themselves are illegitimate without a similar
commitment on their own part.
4. Continued Defense of Affirmative Action
Without continuing pressure, historically white institutions in
America keep sliding back to white. Affirmative action has only the
weakest and most ambivalent of blessings from the Supreme Court,
whose members have divided along a confusing series of almost in-
explicable lines in the past and now appear to be increasingly hostile
to any but the most limited forms of individual relief.29 7 Justice
Scalia was venomous in his first contribution to the dialogue,298 and
continues to be a powerful opponent of affirmative action. 299 De-
spite the rising hostility of the Court toward group remediation, de-
297 See supra note 242.
298 Justice Scalia dissented in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987), making several novel suggestions, among them
the proposition that women and minorities are now the "favored groups" in society, id.
at 674; that those who believe women have been kept out of traditionally male jobs
suffer from a thoroughly laughable and delusional fantasy that women are "eager to
shoulder pick and shovel," id. at 668; that affirmative action is a "powerful engine of
racism and sexism" abroad in the land, riding roughshod over a bunch of poor white
male victims, id. at 677; and that the Court should overrule United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), discussed supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. John-
son, 480 U.S. at 670, 673. I have parodied one or two of these suggestions, but only
mildly.
The most disturbing thing about this dissent, however, is not the amazing tenor of
the propositions just noted, but the fact that it arrives draped in a populist flag. Scalia
first makes the unusual assertion that the majority's opinion is defective because it re-
flects class bias. According to justice Scalia, the rule in Johnson (which allows a desire for
gender diversity to be one factor considered by an employer in a promotion decision as
long as all candidates under consideration are qualified), does not pose much of a threat
to "those in the upper strata of society," because (listen carefully) there are so few fe-
male or minority candidates who are even minimally qualified for those upper strata jobs!
Id. at 675. Scalia observes that this (apparently self-evident) dearth of minority and fe-
male talent in the higher echelons allows the high and mighty to be cavalier about the
burdens others are being asked to shoulder.
Justice Scalia's next move in the populist mode is to identify people like the white
male blue collar incumbent, "theJohnsons of the country," as class victims of a hypocrit-
ically bleeding heart Court: "The irony is that these individuals-predominantly un-
known, unaffluent, unorganized-suffer this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of
thinking itself the champion of the politically impotent." Id. at 677.
No one who has long watched the politics of white supremacy will doubt that the
Johnsons of this country are vulnerable to such talk, and would be likely to applaud it.
Hopefully the work of civil rights scholars will help to make clear for "the Johnsons"
that women and blacks seeking access to previously all-male and all-white jobs are not
the source of the most significant problems white male workers face. I suspect Justice
Scalia will not find it easy, once out of the affirmative action arena, to style himself as an
unalloyed friend of the working man.




spite affirmative action's other problems, civil rights scholars need
to defend affirmative action against opposition. 300
The most important work on affirmative action may take place
in the trenches of each work place and institution. Legal scholars,
for instance, must continue to work for greater diversity "at home"
on university faculties. But we must be ready to defend affirmative
action from attack in other institutions as well.
5. Increased Attention to Problems of the Non-white Underclass
Although we must defend affirmative action, we must also rec-
ognize the increasingly obvious fact that it is unlikely to help mem-
bers of the black underclass significantly in the near future. As a
legal strategy, affirmative action primarily benefits the relatively
privileged sections of the black population, and does little for the
poor. Therefore, a civil rights scholar who is "remembering class"
will learn from the affirmative action debate that she must avoid be-
ing completely consumed in that struggle. She must probe and re-
member and articulate the problems of the poor as well.
Identifying and addressing the most pressing problems of the
black poor are daunting tasks, clearly beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. The discussion above has touched on some possible ap-
proaches.30 1 Of course, many elements of that discussion also apply
to the interests and problems of the white poor. These elements
should be explored. Also, some investigation of the particular
problems of race as they affect people of color at the bottom of the class
structure is in order. Problems of race affect people differently de-
pending on their class position.
6. The Problem of Dependence on Authority
The last scholarly project I propose requires civil rights schol-
ars to examine the tactics, strategies, doctrines, and institutional re-
forms that make us, our clients, or our constituencies dependent on
some form of authority (this authority is usually the state, but in the
affirmative action context it may be an employer or union) to admin-
ister and defend our welfare after the reform battle is won. Scholars
need to investigate the ugly shape of victories that harden into bu-
reaucratic nightmares and the frustrating shapelessness of victories
that melt into unmonitored lassitude.30 2 Too often mechanisms
300 See Kennedy, supra note 23; Lawrence, supra note 40.
301 See supra notes 242-86 and accompanying text. See also Austin, supra note 283.
302 For example, many War on Poverty programs became "part of the problem,"
though they were instituted largely in response to popular pressure for reform. The
National Labor Relations Board now contains conflict more than it promotes the inter-
ests of workers. The present dramatic strike of the United Mine Workers of America
against the Pittston Coal Co. has been unfolding like a morality play on the basis and
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that people fight to establish will ossify and turn back on them, en-
couraging or even enforcing passivity and non-disruptive styles of
responding to problems.303
Of course, as lawyers we are in the thick of this dilemma. A
lawsuit is itself a paradigm of conflict management. The institution-
alized form, the need for expert assistanco, the individualization of
claims, the delay and delay and delay, the elaborate ritual, the scal-
pel of "relevance," the limited remedies, all work to channel our
behavior and mold our perceptions of possibilities. We "do what
we can," we flow like water down a hill, seeking the path of least
resistance, a tiny hole in the rock. Like those Justices on the
Supreme Court who wish to preserve affirmative action and who
adopt the language of management prerogative as one of the few
potentially successful approaches, we often find ourselves pulled
along, making arguments we would rather not make. But, after all,
we must do something.30 4 Furthermore, in pleading a case, or seek-
ing a reform, we quite naturally look to those in power because they
seem to be the ones who can act on it.305
Outside litigation this relationship with authority is still at work.
Legal scholars often direct their articles, perhaps indirectly, toward
figures in authority. This stance in turn impresses itself upon the
ideas that are then articulated. The posture molds the message.
Affirmative action is a program won largely through popular
pressure and then put into the hands of the authorities: the govern-
ment and private employers. These institutions hire affirmative ac-
tion officers, create bureaucracies, and explore the possibilities of
using the program as a means to other ends. Very soon this "vic-
tory" becomes another part of an alienated structure that controls
and even exploits the people it was intended to help. 30 6
Regina Austin voices the haunting desire to "consider using the
law to create and sustain institutions and structures that will belong
to minority women long after the movement has become quiescent
inadequacy of present day labor law. The outcome is still uncertain and may prove of
great consequence to the future of organized labor and the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act. See UMWA, Betraying the Trust: The Pittston Company's Drive to Break
Appalachia's Coafield Communities (newsletter) (1989).
303 See Karl E. Klare, The Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
304 Lawrence, supra note 36, is, in part, a work in this genre.
305 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese grapples with some of these issues, although she
reaches no clear conclusion, pointing out that reliance on the state is often necessary,
for example, in the case of domestic violence. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Women's Rights,
Affirmative Action, and the Myth of Individualism, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 338 (1986).
306 Mark Tushnet explores another example of victory followed by increased passiv-
ity in a discussion of abortion "rights" and the rises and falls of pro-choice activity.
Mark Tushnet, Rights: An Essay in Informal Political Theory (unpublished text of three
lectures on file at Cornell Law Review).
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and the agitation has died."30 7 I understand her fears and yearn-
ings, but I think she longs for the impossible. It is only the presence
of movement that keeps institutions in the hands of the people who
create them.
Still, are some institutions more difficult to "lose" than others?
Can we incorporate safeguards that will somehow make it easier for
us to "keep" them? Could we have a worker-controlled affirmative
action program with enough teeth to advance women and minorities
without eventually turning the machinery over to the authorities?
These are important questions. I hope some people will explore
them.
CONCLUSION
This Article is a plea for civil rights scholars to commit them-
selves to dealing simultaneously and interrelatedly with race and
class. After positing two imaginary and no doubt simplistic "mod-
els" that might help to explain white supremacy in America, the
"race model" and the "class model," 308 I conclude that neither will
suffice. Rather, the inadequacies of each demonstrate the impor-
tance of race and class to a full understanding of white supremacy
and to a viable plan for overcoming it. (I also suggest, rather un-
evenly, that a third axis must be somehow kept in mind and in work
as well, the axis of gender.) The purpose of my effort is to see what
light a race-and-class perspective might shed on civil rights law, par-
ticularly on contemporary affirmative action doctrine, and to sug-
gest approaches and paths that civil rights scholars might pursue
with the aid of this light.)
The investigation began with the observation that we are in a
time of pain and distress at our inability to end white supremacy or
even to make life significantly better for the masses of black people
who still suffer dreadful deprivations and indignities, despite the vic-
tories of the civil rights era. The task of the civil rights movement
now is to press on, to criticize and attack the class/race system that
oppresses the majority of the people in our society, black and white.
The necessity for this progression is plain from the history of
the civil rights movement. The frustrations the movement has en-
countered in its effort to win real improvements for the masses of
black people ("we didn't come all this way for no two seats")3 09 have
307 Austin, Sapphire Bound!, supra note 40, at 10.
308 I posit these models and also go on to quote current legal scholars partially and
loosely as representing what one or the other model might sound like in action. Many of
the people quoted would quite likely refuse to embrace either model if actually offered
the choice.
309 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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been caused by the limits of our racial and economic system. The
need to attack that system is therefore no rhetorical flourish, no left-
ist flight of fancy, but simply a cold fact.310
A number of civil rights scholars have indicated that this is in-
deed the conclusion they draw from the history of the civil rights
movement. One, after despairing that "group-based" remedies for
people of color will be able to survive, concludes:
[T]he future of meaningful equality may depend upon the willing-
ness of the society to voluntarily alter its organization so as to
guarantee to all persons the satisfaction of needs deemed basic to
a meaningful existence.... We must decide whether the costs of
equality will be borne by citizens privately or whether these costs
will be socialized through increased governmental guarantees of
basic needs. 31'
Another says:
[T]he question I would like to pose is whether it is possible to
eliminate racial inequality without attacking general inequality. I
submit that the civil rights mentality assumes that you can. I sub-
mit further that the assumption is incorrect....
What I am suggesting is that, rather than seeking ways to re-
suscitate the civil rights agenda, maybe it is time to move beyond
civil rights toward a human rights agenda that is far richer and
addresses much deeper issues. 312
An approach that would move "beyond civil rights toward a
human rights agenda," 31 3 beyond a struggle for minority rights and
toward a multiracial struggle for guarantees of basic human needs,
faces many obstacles. Two of the greatest obstacles are anti-com-
munism and white racism.
White racism has proved its staying power, its ability to thwart
coalitions and to breed distrust. Throughout American history
blacks have been repeatedly on the front lines and on the move; very
seldom have they rejected white allies. Whites are the ones who
have blindly failed to see that common cause was possible, and that
racial justice helps them too. Although Jesse Jackson's victories in
the North and the South were impressive and heartening, the
number of white people voting for him remained disappointing.
Devising political and legal strategies that will build unity without
pandering to white racism presents a sharp dilemma.
310 By the same token, efforts to change class hierarchies have repeatedly foundered
on the rock of racial division and suffered from the failure to deal successfully with that
division on a practical or theoretical level. The need to attack racism is no nationalist
flight of fancy, but another cold fact.
311 Greene, supra note 197, at 753.
312 Darity, supra note 198, at 978, 979.
313 Id. at 979.
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Anti-communism, too, has survived the test of time. In the
United States, this ideology retains tremendous power both on the
right and on the left. It constricts our ability to imagine on a broad
scale, to dream deep and big (isn't there something about a big deep
dream that is totalitarian?), to know or grasp intelligently the history
of past efforts for change. Furthermore, it distorts the way we talk
together.
Anti-communism particularly affects the civil rights movement.
The fear that the movement's program would be vulnerable to at-
tack from the right as somehow communist or communist-inspired,
and the frequent efforts to head off any such attacks by preemptive
disavowals and self-censorship have seriously inhibited the move-
ment.3 14 All progressive movements for social change in the United
States have been buffeted and weakened by these winds.
I believe civil rights scholars and civil rights activists alike
should try to break out of this pattern. We should refuse to allow
the fear of red-baiting to distort our program, our discourse, our
sources, or our positions. This process must involve deep and well-
informed criticisms of socialism as it exists and must include a con-
centrated effort to understand the varying dynamics of totalitarian-
ism. Part of the process must also be a public rejection of much of
the anti-communist canon and a corresponding insistence that pos-
sibilities and policies be looked at afresh, on their own merits, and
without the bipolar, us-them, all-left-ideas-are-dangerous, distorting
lens of anti-communism. Anti-communism can be destructive, first,
314 Derrick Bell, with characteristic courage, does not leave this stone unturned. See
D. BELL, supra note 3. The "Curia sisters," who have prodded, educated, challenged and
implored the heroine Geneva throughout the narrative, warn her fearfully near the end:
"[B]eware lest your people's enemies construe your desire to change
the structure of government as some form of subversion-a risk that, in
the past, civil rights organizations have taken pains to avoid."
"I have not forgotten," Geneva said, and her voice rang out to the
farthest corner of the Great Hall, "but this is no time to become con-
servative or to draw back from controversy. We must commit ourselves
to salvation for all through means that are peaceful and ethical. And,"
she added, "let me warn those critics who would brand us as advocates of
revolution. If our efforts fail, we are likely to be replaced by actual, and
active, subversives who will earn the apprehensions undeservedly aimed
at us."
id. at 256.
This passage bears the scars of precisely the struggle I am talking about. Who are
these "unpeaceful," "unethical," "actual active subversives"? What is the difference be-
tween a "revolution" and a "change [in] the structu e of government"? What additional
steps might "the critics" encourage you to take in order to prove conclusively your loy-
alty to maintaining your difference from the subversives? What might such steps cost
you? These are not idle questions.
The passage also, however, expresses hope and courage for the future. It an-
nounces that it is time to press on, to keep looking with our own eyes and hearts, to stop
allowing ourselves to be molded and limited by threats, spoken and unspoken.
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as an instrument of repression against progressive movements that
are beginning to achieve results, and, second, as an internal fetter
that interferes with our own ability to see, understand, and move
effectively.
If we can surmount the obstacles I describe, the possibilities are
tremendous. Is it silly even to hope? Can anything but phantoms
rise from the ashes of our expectations? Can we stir these greying
coals to new life? Professor Bell, in the concluding pages of his
book, asks us to hope, though in his view it may be more the hope of
unreason than of reason. Through an alchemy born of faith and
also, mysteriously, of experience, Geneva Crenshaw, the fictional
seer and heroine of Bell's book, announces the vision of a "Third
Way," a way that will be neither withdrawal through emigration to a
separate black state, nor the way of "truly disruptive, even violent,
struggle."3 15 The Third Way will come through "peaceful and ethi-
cal" means, accepting "existing legal and legislative structures"
while working to change them.31 6
Almost everything about this proposal is unsettled, including its
ultimate outcome, about which the author is profoundly agnostic.
One thing is clear, however. The Third Way springs from the no-
tion that the struggle must be one of transcendence and of "justice
for all."3 1 7 In this sense, the final chapter of Bell's bookis a call for
the joining of race and class.
The heroine announces that she will undertake "a systematic
campaign of 'attacking poverty as well as racial discrimina-
tion..... ,"318 Because the book's final passages present such a chal-
lenge to all who would try to struggle on in this tradition, I will close
with a quotation from Professor Bell's Geneva, describing her vision
of the Third Way. I am certain that there are more than three ways,
and that many more visions and formulations lie ahead. I find it
tremendously hopeful and helpful, however, that Bell is searching
for a fusion of race and class, and that he fights his way toward un-
derstanding, rededication and hope, rather than toward the cyni-
cism, despair and passivity that I believe to be the great danger of
our times. Geneva announces to the assembly:
"I am now convinced that the goal of a just society for all is
morally correct, strategically necessary, and tactically sound. The
barriers we face, though high, are not insuperable, and the powers
that brought me these Chronicles are no greater than the forces
available to you-and within you. Use them to the fullest in the
315 Id. at 255.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 254.
318 Id.
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difficult times that lie ahead. And be of good cheer .... We know
that life is to be lived, and not always simply enjoyed; that, in
struggle, there is joy as well as pain... [W]e find courage in the
knowledge that we are not the oppressors and that we have com-
mitted our lives to fighting the oppression of ourselves as well as
of others ....
"Let us, then, rejoice in the memory of the 'many thousands
gone,' those men and women before us who have brought us this
far along the way. Let us be worthy of their courage and endur-
ance, as of our own hopes, our own efforts. And, finally, let us
take up their legacy of faith and carry it forward into the future for
the sake not alone of ourselves and our children but of all human
beings of whatever race or color or creed."3 19
319 Id at 256-57.
